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The Deliberation Paradox and Administrative Law
William R. Sherman ∗
ABSTRACT
Deliberation is a linchpin of administrative decision making, and
is a key basis for judicial deference to the agency’s interpretation of law.
But deliberation has a dual valence in other areas of administrative
law: it triggers the right to access agency information in public meeting
laws, but bars access in public records laws. This is the first Article to
identify and explain what I call the “Deliberation Paradox” in
administrative law. This longstanding but unexplored dichotomy has
roots in common law history, separation of powers, the purposes of public
access statutes, and assumptions about how the government works. But
the development of deference doctrines since Chevron sets deliberation
at cross-purposes, confusing agencies about what is publicly accessible
and denying the public information about vast swaths of government
decisionmaking. This Article contends that the Deliberation Paradox
should be recognized and discarded in favor of an approach that grants
deference only to deliberation that is publicly disclosed, with significant
implications for judicial deference to agency interpretations of law and
for inter-agency collaboration.
INTRODUCTION
Administrative law places great importance on deliberation in
agency decision making. An agency’s careful consideration of
evidence, argument, perspectives, and options can earn it deference
from a reviewing court, and a growing list of statutes and orders
require an agency to weigh certain questions or factors prior to action.
That decision-making process, however, will be either open or closed
to the public, depending on a paradox in open government laws:
∗Adjunct Professor, Seattle University School of Law. I am grateful for advice from Professors
Deborah Ahrens, Kent Barnett, Liz Ford, Charlotte Garden, Matt Hall, Jack Kirkwood,
Margaret Kwoka, Ben Means, Richard Peltz-Steele, Anna Roberts, David Skover, and Tara
Urs. I greatly appreciated the comments from discussants at the Lewis & Clark Law School
Junior Faculty Works-in-Progress Workshop, especially Eric Biber, Mike Blumm, William
Funk, Robert Glicksman, and Sandi Zellmer. Seattle University School of Law students Chris
Bhang and Dru Swaim provided helpful suggestions. Thanks most of all to Holly Barker.
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Deliberation among officials triggers mandatory public access to
certain agency meetings, but exempts public access to agency records.
What accounts for deliberation’s powerful, but contradictory, impact
on administrative law?
This is the first article to identify and explain what I call the
“Deliberation Paradox” 1 in administrative law. State open record
laws and the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) grant
broad access to documents produced, retained, or otherwise used by
the government. But those laws recognize an exemption for records
that reflect the government’s deliberative process, such as internal
memoranda, the recommendations of subordinates, or preliminary
drafts. In other words, records are exempt from disclosure if they
reflect the government’s process of making up its mind. Records of
deliberations, in short, may be kept secret. 2
Open meeting laws, on the other hand, establish a right of
public, in-person access to certain government decision-making
processes as they happen. They apply to meetings of multi-member
bodies such as federal or state commissions or boards, city councils,
and the like—entities that often exercise the same range of executive,
legislative, and adjudicative powers as the agencies covered by open
records laws. Open meeting laws like the Government in the
Sunshine Act and its state counterparts, however, make a critical
distinction between some meetings and others. Those that merely
involve distribution of information don’t need to be public. But
those that involve a deliberative exchange of opinions, positions,
recommendations, or analyses must remain open. Meetings with
deliberation, in short, may not be kept secret. 3
At the same time, judicial review of agency action accords great
weight to deliberation, granting deference to agency interpretation
of laws under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 4 Skidmore v. Swift &
Co., 5 and routine review under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA). 6 Deliberation, then, is a linchpin of administrative law, but in

1. I define the term “paradox” as “one (as a person, situation, or action) having
seemingly
contradictory
qualities
or
phases.”
Paradox,
Merriam-Webster.com,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/paradox (accessed February 13, 2014).
2. See infra section I.B.
3. See infra section I.C.
4. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
5. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
6. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–596 (2011); see infra section I.A.
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a paradoxical way: agency deliberation is the ideal of administrative
decision making, but it triggers the right to access in public meeting
laws and bars access in public records laws. The Deliberation
Paradox goes largely unobserved in judicial and scholarly analyses, 7
but government agencies struggle with it on a daily basis as they seek
to establish policy while simultaneously trying to determine what
records and meetings must be public.
In contemporary governance, the two types of deliberation set
administrative law at cross-purposes, confusing agencies about what
is accessible and denying the public information about vast swaths of
government decision making. Furthermore, statutory and judgemade deliberation requirements in administrative law have
complicated public access to deliberative records.
This Article illuminates an obscure aspect of administrative law:
the peculiar status of deliberation as a shibboleth of deference. It
begins, in Part I, with a more complete explanation of the role of
deliberation in open records and open meeting law and
administrative law as a whole. Part II documents the development of
the divergent applications of deliberation in open government law.
Part III continues this inquiry, turning to the purposes of open
government laws and accompanying assumptions about how the
government works. Together, Parts II and III explain how the
Deliberation Paradox came to exist in its current form. Part IV
observes that the Deliberation Paradox no longer makes sense in the
administrative state because judicial deference to deliberation,
directed deliberation, and consultative deliberation require public
scrutiny to retain democratic legitimacy. Part V concludes that the
Deliberation Paradox should be discarded in favor of an approach
that would condition judicial deference to an agency on the
disclosure of the agency’s deliberation, narrowing the gap between
access to meetings and to records, and leaving a more coherent
understanding of deliberation’s significance for deference doctrines.
This Article aims to establish the Deliberation Paradox as significant
to administrative law; to explain it; to define terminology for its
explication; and to identify its implications and possible remedies.

7. As discussed in section III.C.2, the Paradox is noted by commentators only in the
context of critiques of open meeting laws, and not recognized as a fundamental conflict in
open government and administrative law.
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I. DELIBERATION IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND OPEN
GOVERNMENT
Judicial inquiry into agency deliberation is nagged by a
Heisenbergian question: How can one assess the quality of an
agency’s deliberation without affecting that deliberation? 8 The
refinement of requirements for the deliberative process is inextricably
bound up with the question of public access to administrative
government. From the outset, drafters of the APA considered public
scrutiny of the government’s decision-making process to be an
important part of legitimacy and democratic accountability (and
perhaps quality, as well). 9 But scrutiny of agency deliberation has
troubled courts as they attempt to identify procedures for internal
adjudicatory appeals 10 or otherwise assess agency decisions. 11 At the
same time, public access to and participation in agency deliberations
are seen as a civic good that should be encouraged 12 (although,
according to some, only in moderation). 13 Deliberation, however
scrutinized, remains the gold standard for agency decision making.

8. Please forgive the physics analogy. The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle observes
that it is possible to ascertain the location of an electron, or its speed and direction, but not
both simultaneously. Werner Heisenberg, THE PHYSICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE QUANTUM
THEORY 13 (1949). In application, this means that it is impossible to fully observe an electron
without altering what one observes. The principle has since been loosely extended to describe
any situation in which the observer alters what is being observed.
9. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C § 3(c) (1946)(“Save as otherwise required
by statute, matters of official record shall in accordance with published rule be made available
to persons properly and directly concerned except information held confidential for good
cause found.”).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941) (“Just as a judge cannot be
subjected to such a scrutiny . . . so the integrity of the administrative process must be
equally respected.”).
11. San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 789 F.2d 26,
45 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (noting that “examining the deliberative proceedings of the agency . . .
must be the rare exception”).
12. See, e.g., CASS SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 243
(1993) (“Public deliberation may reveal the truth or falsity of factual claims about the state of
the world or about the likely effects of policy proposals.”); Sidney Shapiro, Elizabeth Fisher &
Wendy Wagner, The Enlightenment of Administrative Law: Looking Inside the Agency for
Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 463, 465 (2013).
13. See, e.g., Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for
Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173, 207–211 (1997) (“Regardless of
the decisional model, participation lends legitimacy to agency decisions . . . . Encouraging
deliberation, then, becomes a matter of managing participation to ensure that the process
remains sufficiently deliberative.”).
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But it is more than that: it is also the key to both daylighting and
shielding government action from public view.
A. Deliberation and Deference
The idealized government decision follows a process of
deliberation—thorough, well-balanced deliberation taking into
account law, facts, values, disparate opinions, predictions of future
events, and context. 14 Administrative agencies are created and
authorized to make decisions with the understanding—really, the
requirement—that the agency consider its actions carefully.
Administrative law is in large part the refinement and application of
this rule to disparate decisions and circumstances. 15 Seen this way,
the validity of an agency’s action is usually more closely linked to the
way it deliberates prior to action than the substance of the
action itself. 16
The development of judicial deference doctrine has further
extended the role of deliberation. In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC,
the Supreme Court held that a court must defer to an agency’s
interpretation of law when that law is ambiguous and the agency’s
14. See, e.g., id. at 205 (noting that deliberative democracy is largely undefined, but
relies on civic virtue; participants must not only respect public viewpoints, they must engage
them). Rossi comments that “[a] deliberative democratic process strives to operate in an
engaged mode, somewhere between mere respect and confrontation.” Id. For a fascinating
discussion of various theoretical and psychological conceptions of deliberation, see Andre
Baechtiger, Address at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association: On
Perfecting the Deliberative Process: Agonistic Inquiry as a Key Deliberative Technique, (July
19, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1642280.
15. See Shapiro, Fisher & Wagner, supra note 12, at 465. Most significantly, the focus
on the rational–instrumental paradigm deflects attention from the “deliberative–constitutive”
paradigm, which originated in the Progressive Era—a paradigm that relied on expertise,
deliberation, and reason giving to establish legitimacy of public administration. See also William
R. Sherman, A Pragmatic Republic, If You Can Keep It, 112 MICH. L. REV. 905 (2014)
(discussing the internal standards developed by early administrative agencies in the United
States). Shapiro, Fisher and Wagner explain that the deliberative model of agency decision
making was key to the legitimacy of the administrative state. In this way, agencies and
commissions were vehicles for “defining issues, sifting evidence, posing problems and
enlightening the public mind.” Shapiro, Fisher & Wagner, supra note 12, at 473 (quoting
Justice Frankfurter).
16. See MICHAEL ASIMOW & RONALD LEVIN, STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 11 (3d ed. 2011) (“Civic republicans believe that . . . the role of administrative law
should be to facilitate the deliberative process, minimize political influences over the
administrative process, and assure that agency decisions are well explained and rational . . . .
Under the civic republican model, the rulemaking process promotes deliberation because the
notice and comment system invites all citizens to participate and articulate their own values.”).
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interpretation is based on a permissible construction of the statute. 17
In forgoing the judicial authority to interpret the law, Chevron and
related cases 18 place great importance on the reasonableness of the
agency decision-making process. Specifically, an agency earns judicial
deference if it properly deliberated in the course of its decision. In
fact, courts will grant deference on a scale that slides with
deliberation, and remand agency decisions that are unaccompanied
by a proper explanation. 19
Thus, deliberation is critical at two stages of judicial review of
agency action: first, in application of basic agency decision making
procedure standards; and second, in application of deference
doctrines under Chevron.
The Administrative Procedure Act was an effort to standardize (and
mandate) the steps of adjudication and rulemaking.20 It reflects a central
role for deliberation. Adjudication under APA section 554 requires the
agency to consider facts and arguments; section 557 requires statements
of reasons or basis for decisions.21 Rulemaking under APA section 553
requires the agency to “consider” submitted “written data, views, or
arguments.”22 Upon publication of a rule, APA section 553(c) requires
the agency to issue a “concise general statement of . . . basis and

17. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
18. See, e.g., Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944); United States v. Mead
Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). For an extensive, and useful, discussion of Skidmore, Chevron,
and congressional treatment of deference doctrines, see Kent Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, 90
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2015).
19. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. See also Evan Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U.
L. REV. 1271, 1292 (2008); Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83
(1994). There is a distinction, to be sure, between the process of deliberation and the giving of
a reason that accompanies a decision. The requirement for reason-giving implicitly requires
deliberation, but there is no requirement that the reason given actually disclose the entire
deliberative process. See, e.g., David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 2317 (2010)
(arguing that various standards for judicial review of agency action collapse into a
reasonableness test).
20. See generally George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure
Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557 (1996). It is a mistake to
consider the APA the starting point for administrative law, but so far as transsubstantive
statutes and the application of due process to administrative deliberation, it is a significant
milestone. See Sherman, supra note 15, at 905–906 (discussing the multitude of alleged
birthdates of administrative law).
21. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 557.
22. See also Model State Admin. Procedures Act (MSAPA) § 12 (1961); Administrative
Procedure Act 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (1964).
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purpose.”23 Both on their own terms and as applied by the courts, these
mandates require direct engagement with facts, opinions, and
arguments by agency decisionmakers.24 The federal APA and state APAs
could have established procedural steps that did not require any specific
agency deliberation, but they did not. Instead, they included the quite
reasonable expectation that the agency would take the procedure
seriously, and carefully consider its action.
But deliberation plays an even more significant role in judicial
review of agency action. Under the APA, a court can set aside agency
action, findings, and conclusions found to be “arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 25
Although “arbitrary and capricious” means many things, at its core it
means “unaccompanied by a reasoned decision-making process.” 26
Arbitrary and capricious review authorizes courts to take a “hard
look” at agency decision making—but the Supreme Court has
emphasized that it is aimed at the decision-making process, not the
merits of the decision itself. Thus, “hard look” review as a procedural
check (not a substantive limit) on agency reasoning starts with the
mandate that an agency follow a reasoned decision-making process,
demonstrating that there was some process of deliberation that
preceded agency action. 27

23. See also MSAPA § 3–110(a) (1981) (calling for “a concise explanatory statement
containing . . . [the agency’s] reasons for adopting the rule”).
24. See, e.g., Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936) (requiring that an agency’s
internal appeal process not detach the hearing from the deciding official); Auto. Parts &.
Accessories Ass’n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (holding that “major issues of
policy” must be addressed in a rule’s explanatory statement). See also Jerry L. Mashaw,
Reasoned Administration: The European Union, the United States, and the Project of Democratic
Governance, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 99, 118 (2007).
25. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2014). See also Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification:
Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75
TEX. L. REV. 483, 491–92 (1997) (“Courts require that agencies offer detailed explanations
for their actions. The agency’s explanation must address all factors relevant to the agency’s
decision. A court may reverse a decision if the agency fails to consider plausible alternative
measures and explain why it rejected these for the regulatory path it chose.”).
26. For an extended discussion of this argument, see Seidenfeld, supra note 25 at 491–
524 (“Essentially, under the hard look test, the reviewing court scrutinizes the agency’s
reasoning to make certain that the agency carefully deliberated about the issues raised by its
decision.”). See also Harold Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the
Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 511 (1974) (cited in Seidenfeld, supra note 25).
27. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (holding
that “hard look” review goes to inspection of process, not substantive conclusions); Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (holding, inter alia, that arbitrary
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Deliberation takes on an especially pivotal role in the application
of judicial deference to agency interpretations of law, most
prominently in the Chevron doctrine. A minor industry of
scholarship followed in Chevron’s wake to identify the justification
for judicial deference (which, after all, seemed a situational
abdication of the courts’ duty to say “what the law is”). 28That
justification has been located in technical expertise, programmatic
expertise, institutional competence, congressional delegation, and
process theory. But every such justification has at its heart the
requirement that the agency carefully deliberate before announcing
its interpretation. 29 Courts consistently treat a deliberative decisionmaking process as cause for deference, and the absence of a
deliberative decision as a reason to deny deference. Thus, Chevron
deference is denied certain types of agency interpretations, such as
positions taken by agencies in litigation, because they are not “the
result of the agency’s deliberative processes.” 30 Although Chevron
was quickly recognized as a watershed decision in administrative law,
the reliance on deliberation did not originate with Chevron; in fact,
the case can be seen as a continuation of a long line of cases in which
the courts deferred to agency interpretations of law that were
developed with sufficient deliberative processes. 31
Proto-Chevron
deference
doctrine
consistently
placed
deliberation front-and-center in the model of agency process. Under
the arbitrary and capricious standard, a government decision must be
upheld “if it is the result of a deliberate, principled reasoning process
and capricious review required the agency to consider relevant factors). See also Zaring, supra
note 19.
28. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 137 (1803).
29. This Article’s assessment of deliberation as a key to deference should be understood
as distinct from, but not necessarily in conflict with, understandings of Chevron and Skidmore
that focus on congressional delegation or agency expertise. Those understandings approach
deference as a question of design, rather than decision-making process. See, e.g., Barnett, supra
note 18.
30. National Wildlife Fed’n v. Browner, 127 F.3d 1126, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see also
Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590, 599 (7th Cir. 2012) (refusing to give deference to
agency amicus brief position due to lack of process) aff’d on other grounds, 134 S. Ct. 870
(2014); Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 1877, 2165–68 (2012)
(refusing to give deference to agency position in amicus brief).
31. See, e.g., Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168–69
(1962); Sec. Indus. Assoc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 207, 217
(1984) (according deference to agency interpretation of law where the agency conducted
proper analysis); NLRB v. Action Auto., Inc., 469 U.S. 490, 495 & n.4, 496 (1985) (granting
weight based on thoroughness of consideration).
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and if it is supported by substantial evidence.” 32 But the significance
of deliberation for judicial review of agency decisions goes far
beyond the minimal requirement to avoid arbitrary and capricious
decisions or processes. The level of agency deliberation determines
what level of deference a reviewing court will give a decision.
Deliberation is not mere shorthand for care, nor a universal positive
descriptor given to good decisions. Rather, it refers to the reasoned
consideration of factors and use of reasoned explanations for final
decisions. As the Ninth Circuit put it,
Ad hoc agency action such as here is also entitled to some
deference, but not all deference is created equal. How much
deference an agency decision is due depends in part on such factors
as how much deliberation went into reaching it and whether the
decision fits with a policy the agency has consistently followed. 33

Perhaps most clearly, United States v. Mead Corp. states that the
deference given to an agency decision is directly related to the level
and quality of an agency’s deliberative process. 34 Under Mead,
Congress must have “delegated authority to the agency generally to
make rules carrying the force of law,” and the agency interpretation
claiming deference must have been promulgated in the exercise of
that authority. 35 If the agency’s decision is a result of a sufficiently
formal and deliberative process to warrant deference, it will receive a
high degree of deference. 36

32. Balmert v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 601 F.3d 497, 501 (6th Cir.2010)
(quoting Baker v. United Mine Workers of Am. Health & Returned Funds, 929 F.2d 1140,
1144 (6th Cir. 1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also N.Y. State Bar Ass’n v. FTC,
276 F.Supp.2d 110 (D.D.C. 2003) (holding that interpretation was not the product of notice
and comment rulemaking, did not appear to have been made with any degree of deliberation,
and was supported only by post hoc rationalization, hence was arbitrary and capricious) aff’d,
Am. Bar Ass’n v. F.T.C., 430 F.3d 457, (D.C. Cir. 2005).
33. A & W Smelter & Refiners, Inc. v. Clinton, 146 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 1998);
see also Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Pena, 44 F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir.1994), aff’d sub
nom. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R., 516 U.S. 152 (1996);
Barnett v. Weinberger, 818 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
34. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–31 (2001).
35. Id. at 226–27.
36. Id. at 230 (“It is fair to assume generally that Congress contemplates administrative
action with the effect of law when it provides for a relatively formal administrative procedure tending
to foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such force.”).
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Enforcement decisions, as well, receive deference on a scale that
slides with deliberation. 37 The same is true of decisions related to
interpretive rules or internal agency guidance: documents that are
not adopted under a sufficiently deliberative process will get less
deference than those that are. 38 Courts apply this yardstick across the
board; an extensive deliberative process, including gathering input
and considering it, places a decision “comfortably within the
category of agency decision making procedures that support
Chevron deference.” 39
Other developments in administrative law, however, demonstrate
that deliberation must consist of more than mere reasoned decision
making. A proliferation of transsubstantive administrative statutes,
from the National Environmental Policy Act to the Paperwork
Reduction Act, rely on the notion that a sound decision must
consider certain factors and articulate reasoning related to them. The
complication comes not merely from the requirement of additional
deliberation, but rather from the requirement of a certain type of
deliberation, in which decision makers consider many specific factors
and views, and must explain how they affected, or did not affect, the
final outcome. 40 Through statute, regulation, and executive order,
agencies are now required to include in their deliberations any
environmental consequences, costs and benefits, regulatory burden,
and other aspects of decisions. 41 An agency’s compliance with

37. NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 256–
57 (1995) (explaining that the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency “is charged with the
enforcement of banking laws to an extent that warrants the invocation of [the rule of
deference] with respect to his deliberative conclusions as to the meaning of these laws.”
(quoting Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn., 479 U.S. 388, 403–404 (1987))).
38. Ebbert v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 319 F.3d 103, 115 (3d Cir. 2003) (“We also
decline to defer to the explanation of the agency’s position in its Compliance Manual. As an
internal document, it is automatically at the lower end of the Skidmore scale of deference. An
internal agency manual is not subject to the kind of deliberateness or thoroughness that gives
rise to significant deference.”).
39. Vill. of Barrington v. Surface Transp. Bd., 636 F.3d 650, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
40. See, e.g., Michael Blumm & Stephen Brown, Pluralism and the Environment: The
Role of Comment Agencies in NEPA Litigation, 14 HARV. ENVT’L. L. REV. 277 (1990)
(describing NEPA as process-driven).
41. See Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, 2 U.S.C. chs. 17A, 25; Regulatory Flexibility
Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-603;National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act, 15 U.S.C. §
272; National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C);Paperwork
Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3520; Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 § 3 (1981),
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 §§ 2–4 (1993), Exec. Order No. 12,866.
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requirements for what I call “directed deliberation” 42 can only be
fully assessed with inquiry into the agency’s decision-making process.
But as central as deliberation is to administrative law, our system
assigns two incompatible roles to public scrutiny of (or participation
in) that deliberation: if the deliberation is on paper, it is secret; if the
deliberation is in the context of a certain type of meeting, it must be
public. Despite the ubiquity of deliberation requirements in modern
administrative law, neither courts nor commentators have previously
identified the paradox in laws preserving access to government:
deliberation is the touchstone for guaranteeing public access to
meetings of government officials, but it carves a vast exemption to
public access to records of those same officials or their agencies. The
Deliberation Paradox touches on every area of administrative
decision making.
B. Deliberation and Public Records
Much of what we know about our administrative state is the
result of open records laws. A records request is the first, and often
best, tool of the reporter, litigant, businessman, citizen, or scholar.
Writing a newspaper article about teachers with criminal history? A
records request to the school district is the first step. 43 Suing a doctor
for malpractice? Ask the state for prior licensure complaints. 44
Looking to contract with the government? Get copies of similar
proposals and contracts. 45 Want to learn how safely the Navy stores
explosives near your seaside village? FOIA is your best bet. 46 Curious
about how the government allows citizen participation? For reliable
empirical data, start with each agency’s public records contact. 47
Each of these requests, and others like them, will net the
requester a substantial amount of valuable information. But the
requester may be denied any documents showing the government’s

42. “Directed deliberation” and its implications for the Deliberation Paradox are
discussed more fully in section IV.B, infra.
43. See, e.g., Bellevue John Does 1-11 v. Bellevue Sch. Dist. No. 405, 164 Wash. 2d
199 (2008).
44. See, e.g., Calloway v. Ohio State Med. Bd., 990 N.E.2d 673 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013).
45. See, e.g., Mead Data Cent. Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Air Force, 566 F.2d 242 (D.C.
Cir. 1977).
46. See, e.g., Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259 (2011).
47. David L. Markell & Tom R. Tyler, Using Empirical Research to Design Government
Citizen Participation Processes, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 13 & n.61 (2008).
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deliberative process—the internal or interagency emails, memoranda,
reports, comments, recommendations, or notes used as people in the
government came to a decision. None of the following must be
produced: the prosecutor’s memo weighing whether to charge the
teacher with a crime; the medical licensing board’s emails
considering various penalties for the doctor; the government
procurement agency’s analysis of low-bid contract proposals; the
Navy’s preliminary memo supporting one plan and not another for
ordnance storage; two subcabinet assistant secretaries’ notes from
their meeting about how to react to a directive from the White
House. Those documents reflect the government’s deliberative
process, and for that reason they can remain secret under FOIA and
every state open record law.
The specific language, structure, and coverage of the federal and
state laws shed some light on the particular deliberations to be
shielded from public view and why.
1. The federal Freedom of Information Act
The federal Freedom of Information Act (universally known as
FOIA) grew from minor provisions in the original Administrative
Procedure Act that gave interested parties access to a limited
universe of documents related to APA-governed decisions. 48 From
such humble beginnings, in 1966 Congress enacted FOIA, and
substantially strengthened it in 1974. It was a cornerstone of the
“sunshine laws” movement that began in the 1950s and flourished
in the post-Watergate era, opening government records to public
access on the theory that sunlight is the best disinfectant 49—that is,
public
scrutiny
exposes,
and
therefore
hampers
or
remedies, corruption.
The key provisions of FOIA work like this: section 552(a)(3)
requires an agency to furnish any reasonably described record

48. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 § 3(c).
49. The phrase is attributed to Justice Louis Brandeis. See LOUIS BRANDEIS, OTHER
PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT (1914) (“Sunlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants.”). But see Jon Stewart, THE DAILY SHOW, June 25, 2009, available at
http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/thu-june-25-2009/cheney-predacted (“It’s a beautiful
metaphor, although I do have to caution . . . sunlight is actually a terrible, terrible disinfectant.
If you do . . . have a cut or an open wound of any kind, I cannot stress this enough, do not
clean it out with sunlight.”).
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requested by any person for any reason. 50 Section 552(b) lays out a
number of exemptions to the basic rule; pertinent to this Article,
subsection 5 exempts “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums
or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than
an agency in litigation with the agency.” 51 Although the language
itself is fairly opaque, Exemption 5 is interpreted to establish what is
known as the “deliberative process” exemption, 52 which aims to
“prevent injury to the quality of agency decisions.” 53
But the purposes of the exemption appear to be broader than
mere prevention of injury. Courts have identified at least three goals
behind the exception: First, to encourage frank discussions of policy
among agency staff and officials; second, to protect against
disclosure of policy proposals and ideas before they are actually
adopted; and third, to avoid the confusion that might result from the
misperception that certain reasons and rationales resulted in agency
action. 54 Courts treat the exemption as a two-part inquiry: First, are
the documents inter- or intra-party memorandums or letters? And
second, would disclosure of them cause “injury to the quality of
agency decisions”? 55 Neither of these questions is as simple as it
might seem.
The phrase “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or
letters” has never been taken literally. Rather, the exemption includes
any record that is treated as though it was part of the government’s
internal decision-making process. Consequently, when private
contractors are retained to provide advice in the same way that an
50. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A).
51. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2006), amended by OPEN Government Act of 2007, Pub.
L. No. 110175, 121 Stat. 2524
52. See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 149 (1975); see also U. S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 359 (2006).
53. Sears, 421 U.S. at 151.
54. See, e.g., Russell v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 682 F.2d 1045, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Jordan v.
Dep’t of Justice, 591 F.2d 753, 772–73 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Kidd v. Dep’t of Justice, 362 F. Supp.
2d 291, 296 (D.D.C. 2005) (protecting documents on basis that disclosure would “inhibit
drafters from freely exchanging ideas, language choices, and comments in drafting documents”)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Heggestad v. Dep’t of Justice, 182 F. Supp. 2d
1, 12 (D.D.C. 2000) (protecting memoranda containing recommendations based on perjured
testimony, finding that they “have no probative value to the public since they are based on
misrepresentations”); Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, 63
F.Supp.2d 104, 108 (D. Mass. 1999) (holding that release of predecisional documents “could
cause harm by providing the public with erroneous information”).
55. Sears, 421 U.S. at 151.
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agency employee would be used, or when non-governmental experts
are consulted for advice (as distinct from other input), their
communications will be considered inter- or intra-agency. 56
But the second question—whether disclosure would cause injury
to the decision-making process—is more interesting. As applied by the
courts, this portion of the deliberative process exemption seeks to
protect nothing less than the “decision making processes of
government agencies.” 57 In turn, this exemption applies to those
communications in which “agencies [may] freely . . . explore
alternative avenues of action and . . . engage in internal debates
without fear of public scrutiny.” 58 To remain exempt under this
section, the communication must be deliberative (i.e., “a direct part of
the deliberative process in that it makes recommendations or expresses
opinions on legal or policy matters”). 59
The communication of recommendations or opinions is at the
center of FOIA’s concept of “deliberation.” Under Exemption 5, a
document is deliberative when it “makes recommendations or
expresses opinions on legal or policy matters” 60 or when it “reflect[s]
the personal opinions of the writer rather than the policy of the
agency.” 61 In addition, the idea of deliberation includes the act of
weighing arguments in the development of a decision. In one
important opinion, the court looked closely at “whether the
document is so candid or personal in nature that public disclosure is
likely in the future to stifle honest and frank communication within
the agency” and “whether the document is deliberative in nature,
56. The distinction can be blurry, particularly when an outside party is in the process of
negotiating to become a contractor or consultant. During the negotiating process, FOIA treats
the outside party as nongovernmental—and thus unprotected by the deliberative process
exemption. For example, when the Air Force negotiated with West Publishing Co. for legal
research software, Lexis’s parent company wanted to see the documents. The court
distinguished between documents reflecting the Air Force’s internal evaluation of the
negotiations, which were exempt, and a document summarizing the offers and counter-offers
exchanged during the negotiations, which were not. See Mead Data Cent. Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 257–58 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (evaluating whether documents relating to
the negotiation of an Air Force licensing agreement were exempt).
57. Sears, 421 U.S. at 150 (quoting Tennessean Newspapers, Inc. v. FHA, 464 F.2d
657, 660 (CA6 1972) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
58. Missouri ex rel. Shorr v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 147 F.3d 708, 710 (8th
Cir. 1998).
59. Jordan v. Dep’t of Justice, 591 F.2d 753, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (quoting Vaughn v.
Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
60. Vaughn, 523 F.2d at 1144.
61. Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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weighing the pros and cons of agency adoption of one viewpoint or
another.” 62 This concept is often summarized as documents that
reflect the “give-and-take” of the decision-making process. 63
The nuance and complexity of FOIA Exemption 5 are
sufficiently deep to warrant book chapters and many journal
articles. 64 But at its core, this deliberative process exemption protects
the secrecy of a vast scope of records, so long as they were
antecedent to a final decision and were part of the process of an
agency’s internal decision making. And unlike many state deliberative
process exemptions, FOIA’s exemption continues to apply even after
the agency has made a final decision. 65
2. Public records laws in the states
The public record statutes of the states—and every state has
one—are largely patterned after FOIA. 66 These laws have, from the
start, exempted records reflecting the government’s deliberative
process. 67 Yet in practice, courts have strained the deliberative
process exemption to cover virtually anything used by or submitted
to the government; it is not limited to “intra-agency documents
prepared by a government agency,” but includes all
“‘recommendations’ made as part of the deliberative process,”
62. Id.
63. Marzen v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 632 F.Supp. 785, 814 (N.D.
Ill. 1986).
64. FOIA Exemption 5 contains twenty-five words; the DOJ manual on Exemption 5
is sixty pages long with 307 footnotes. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5); Department of Justice Guide to
the Freedom of Information Act 357-416 (2006).
65. See, e.g., Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 360 (1979); Elec.
Privacy Info. Ctr. v. DHS, 384 F.Supp.2d 100, 112–13 (D.D.C. 2005) (“Contrary to
plaintiff’s assertion that materials lose their Exemption 5 protection once a decision is taken, it
is the document’s role in the agency’s decision-making process that controls.”); Judicial Watch
of Fla., Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 102 F.Supp.2d 6, 16 (D.D.C. 2000) (rejecting as
“unpersuasive” the assertion that deliberative process privilege is inapplicable after
deliberations have ended and relevant decision has been made); May v. Dep’t of the Air Force,
777 F.2d 1012, 1014–15 (5th Cir. 1985); Cuccaro v. Sec’y of Labor, 770 F.2d 355, 357–59
(3d Cir. 1985).
66. See Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the
Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1161 (2002). Although some commentators refer to
state FOIAs or “little FOIAs,” this Article will reserve the term FOIA for the federal Freedom
of Information Act and will refer to state laws as state open records laws or by specific name,
such as the Georgia Public Records Act, Ga. Code Ann. § 15-18.
67. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6254(a); FLA. STAT. §§ 119.01-119.15; 5 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 140/7(1)(f); WASH. REV. CODE 42.56.280.
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apparently regardless of source. 68 For example, one state court of
appeals held that a document was exempt from disclosure even
though an outside party submitted the document to the
government and had an adversarial negotiating relationship with
the government. The court reasoned that the document was
reflective of the government’s deliberative process because it was
considered by the government in its policymaking process,
constituting a “note[]” or “recommendation[],” even though it
was the note or recommendation of an outside adversarial party. 69
At the state level, then, it appears that courts are tempted to
interpret the deliberative process exemption to create non-statutory
exemptions where candid deliberation is desirable within the realm
of agency discretion. For example, in the case discussed above, it
seems likely that the court wished to create, sub rosa, an exemption
for documents used during a collective bargaining process.
Interestingly, some jurisdictions appear to contemplate an end to
either the deliberative process or the usefulness of (or justification
for) secrecy; these states put a timer on the deliberative process
exemption. When the government makes a final decision, the
deliberative materials leading up to the decision are no longer
protected from disclosure. Deliberative materials are exempt only
until the policies or recommendations contained in such records
are implemented. 70
Thus, although there are some differences at the margins, generally
state open records laws exempt predecisional internal or inter-agency
communications that reflect an agency’s deliberative process.
B. Deliberation and Public Meetings
If public records are the first critical avenue of public access to
administrative government, agency meetings are a close second. This
is especially true at the state and local level, where city councils with
plenary power and multiple boards and commissions exert
substantial executive and legislative power. Open meeting laws bear
some superficial similarity to open record laws; they state that all
68. See, e.g., ACLU v. City of Seattle, 89 P.3d 295, 297–300 (Wash. 2004) (holding
that materials submitted by an outside party to the agency, but used by the agency, reflected
the agency’s deliberative process). The author represented the ACLU of Washington at a later
phase of this case.
69. Id. at 551.
70. See, e.g., Dawson v. Daly, 845 P.2d 995, 1002 (Wash. 1993).
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meetings of certain governmental bodies must be open, subject to
certain exceptions. But the parallels end there. Open meeting laws
cover gatherings of boards, commissions, councils, and agencies led
by multiple members—they do not apply to just any meeting of
government employees. The laws reflect a procedural difference as
well, because a meeting can only be open if it is accessible to the
public in real time, not in recorded form after the fact. In addition,
although a formerly private document can be later disclosed, a closed
meeting cannot be retroactively opened to the public. 71 And,
importantly, agency meetings need only be public if they
include deliberation.
1. The Government in the Sunshine Act
The most prominent federal open meeting law is the
Government in the Sunshine Act of 1976. 72 The Sunshine Act
requires that meetings of federal agencies be open, with some
exceptions. On the surface, the requirement applies to every agency.
However, the definitions of “agency” and “meeting” are sufficiently
narrow so that the Act does not apply to a large array of situations in
which the public may seek access. “Agency” is defined as an entity
“headed by a collegial body composed of two or more individual
members, a majority of whom are appointed to such position by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate [or a]
subdivision thereof authorized to act on behalf of the agency.” 73 So
entities like the Federal Trade Commission or the Federal
Communications Commission are covered, but only at the very top
level—the presidential appointees themselves. This can lead to some
confusing results; for example, it means that the Atomic Safety
Licensing Board is not an “agency” for the purposes of the Sunshine
Act because its members are appointed by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, not the President. 74 Altogether, about fifty federal
agencies are subject to the Act.
71. This description may oversimplify the matter somewhat because meetings held in
executive session might later be found subject to open meeting requirements, and then the
minutes or recordings would be disclosed. But the meeting itself cannot be retrospectively
opened in any real sense.
72. 5 U.S.C. § 552b
73. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(a)(1).
74. RICHARD PELTZ-STEELE, THE LAW OF ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT 160 (2012)
(citing Hunt v. NRC, 611 F.2d 332 (10th Cir. 1979)).
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The Sunshine Act defines a “meeting” as “the deliberations of at
least the number of individual agency members required to take
action on behalf of the agency where such deliberations determine or
result in the joint conduct or disposition of official agency
business . . . .” 75 That definition limits the applicability of the statute,
as not all gatherings are worthy of the name “meeting.” Only
deliberations that result in action are meetings; deliberations “upon
matters not within a subdivision’s formally delegated authority,” “a
series of joint planning conferences . . . where the sessions are not
convened by the agency and subject to the agency’s unilateral
control,” and “a conversation between a member of an agency and
members of the regulated industry” are not covered. 76
The identification of deliberation as the trigger for the Sunshine
Act is not an accident; rather, the act of deliberating is precisely what
separates a conversation that may be secret from a conversation that
must be public. The D.C. Circuit observed:
Congress enacted the Sunshine Act to open the deliberations of
multi-member federal agencies to public view. It believed that
increased openness would enhance citizen confidence in
government, encourage higher quality work by government
officials, stimulate well-informed public debate about government
programs and policies, and promote cooperation between citizens
and government. In short, it sought to make government more
fully accountable to the people. 77

The object of public view is the deliberations themselves—the
“serious exchange of views” 78 rather than a mere briefing or
background discussion. 79
75. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(a)(2). For a helpful discussion of deliberation occurring in the
information-gathering stage of agency decision making, see David A. Barrett, Comment,
Facilitating Government Decision Making: Distinguishing Between Meetings and Nonmeetings
Under the Federal Sunshine Act, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1195, 1201-02 (1988). See also Susan T.
Stephenson, Note, Government in the Sunshine Act: Opening Federal Agency Meetings, 26 AM.
U. L. REV. 154, 154 n.3 (1976).
76. See PELTZ-STEELE, supra note 74, at 160 (citing cases and examples). See also
RICHARD K. BERG, STEPHEN H. KLITZMAN, & GARY J. EDLES, AN INTERPRETIVE GUIDE TO
THE GOVERNMENT IN THE SUNSHINE ACT 14-16 (2d ed. 2005) (parsing the precise nature of
conversations that trigger the definition of “meeting” for GSA purposes).
77. Common Cause v. NRC, 674 F.2d 921, 928 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
78. BERG ET AL., supra note 75, at 9–10 (“[T]he meeting must consist of ‘deliberations
[which] determine or result in the joint conduct or disposition of official agency business’ . . . .
Thus, at a minimum, ‘meeting’ includes any gathering of the requisite number of members where
a serious exchange of views achieves a consensus on a matter of official agency business.”).
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3. State open meeting law
All fifty states have statutes requiring that most state or local
agency meetings be held in public. 80 State open meeting laws
typically cover any state, county, or municipal government-convened
multi-member body with decision-making or advisory authority. 81
Because state and local governments tend to distribute executive,
rulemaking, and adjudicative powers among many such bodies, state
open meeting laws have substantial reach. Beyond the typical city
council meeting, these statutes also apply to state utility and railroad
commissions, governing boards of state universities or colleges,
gambling commissions, and labor relations boards. 82 Thus, open
meeting laws apply to many of the core administrative and legislative
agencies at the state and local level.
The structure of these laws is relatively straightforward: Meetings
of covered entities must (1) be open to the public, (2) publish an
agenda, and (3) keep minutes. Exceptions exist for personnel
decisions, quasi-judicial hearings, attorney-client communications, and
certain other purposes. But, unlike open records laws, no exception
exists that permits deliberation in secret. In fact, deliberation is the
shibboleth that identifies which meetings must be open. 83

79. FCC v. ITT World Commc’ns, Inc., 466 U.S. 463, 471–74 (1984) (holding that a
“meeting” occurs when the agency deliberates on matters within its formal delegated
authority, but not when the agency receives a briefing or background materials). One
commentator, however, has argued that the Sunshine Act interprets “deliberations” as
primarily a narrowing function, in which the range of possible policy choices is winnowed prior
to a decision stage of discussions. Barrett, supra note 75, at 1205–06.
80. See Teresa Dale Pupillo, Comment, The Changing Weather Forecast: Government in the
Sunshine in the 1990s—An Analysis of State Sunshine Laws, 71 WASH. U. L. Q. 1165, 1165 (1993).
81. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 286.011; FLA. CONST. ART. I, § 24(b); WASH. REV.
CODE 42.30.020.
82. ANN TAYLOR SCHWING, OPEN MEETING LAWS 78-82 (3d ed. 2011).
83. A state law definition of deliberation “typically includes the discussions of the
decision makers, the verbalization of their thought processes and the collective acquisition of
reports or statements of fact or opinion.” Id. at 440–41. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch.
30A §18 (defining deliberation as “an oral or written communication through any medium,
including electronic mail, between or among a quorum of a public body on any public business
within its jurisdiction”); TEX GOV’T CODE ANN §551.001(2) (defining deliberation as “a
verbal exchange during a meeting between a quorum of a governmental body, or between a
quorum of a governmental body and another person, concerning an issue within the
jurisdiction of the governmental body or any public business.”).
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Washington State’s Open Public Meetings Act is typical. 84 This
law states that “[a]ll meetings of the governing body of a public
agency shall be open and public and all persons shall be permitted to
attend any meeting.” 85 As with many administrative statutes, the key
details appear in the definitions; but in this case, the less-than-helpful
definition of “meeting” is “meetings at which action is taken.” 86 And
the definition of “action” is “the transaction of the official business
of a public agency by a governing body including but not limited to
receipt of public testimony, deliberations, discussions, considerations,
reviews, evaluations, and final actions.” 87 Lest there be any doubt
that deliberation is the key, the law states that “[i]t is the intent of
this law that [a public agency’s] actions be taken openly and that
their deliberations be conducted openly.” 88
Deliberation involving a give-and-take discussion is sometimes
best defined in contrast to a passive factual briefing. Some states
require so-called “fact-finding” sessions to be open. 89 In practical
effect, informational briefings are likely to feature questions and

84. Others are similar. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 54952.2(a) and (b) (defining
“meeting” as “any congregation of a majority of the members of a legislative body at the same
time and place to hear, discuss, or deliberate” and directing that “any use of direct
communication, personal intermediaries, or technological devices that is employed by a
majority of the members . . . to develop a collective concurrence as to action to be taken on an
item by the members . . . is prohibited”); IDAHO CODE § 67-2341(6) (defining “meeting” as
“the convening of a governing body of a public agency to make a decision or to deliberate
toward a decision on any matter”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 21.2(2) (“‘Meeting’ means a
gathering in person or by electronic means, formal or informal, of a majority of the members
of a governmental body where there is deliberation or action upon any matter within the scope
of the governmental body’s policy-making duties.”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75 4317a
(“‘[M]eeting’ means any gathering, assembly, telephone call or any other means of interactive
communication by a majority of a quorum of the membership of a body or agency . . . for the
purpose of discussing the business or affairs of the body or agency.”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 844-102(b)(2) (defining “meeting” as “the convening of a governing body of a public body for
which a quorum is required in order to make a decision or to deliberate toward a decision”).
85. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.30.030 (1971).
86. Id. at § 42.30.020(3).
87. Id. (emphasis added).
88. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.030.010 (1971). This statute was cited in Miller v. City of
Tacoma, 979 P.2d 429, 433, 439 (Wash. 1999) (“The people insist on remaining informed so
that they may retain control over the instruments they have created. . . . The overall intent of
the Open Public Meetings Act is that governmental bodies take actions openly and conduct
deliberations openly.”).
89. See, e.g., Georgia Open Meetings Act, GA. CODE ANN. § 50-14-1(a)(2) (1981)
(stating that both “fact-finding” and purely deliberative sessions must comply with the Act).
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exchanges that can become deliberative, and thus informational
briefings are likely to be open anyway. 90
That contrast between meetings with and without deliberation is
most stark when applied to virtual, or serial, meetings, in which
individuals are not physically gathered, but communicate in a series
of smaller groups, either in person or by message. A series of subquorum meetings can add up to a virtual meeting that triggers open
meeting law requirements. 91 But even then, the applicability of open
meeting law depends on whether the communications constitute
“deliberation.” For example, an exchange of emails among school
district board members was considered a meeting because the
substance of the communications involved deliberation—“the active
exchange of information and opinions” on a matter of public
business, not “the mere passive receipt of information.” 92
The significance of the “active exchange” portion of the court’s
analysis is brought into sharper relief by the Virginia Supreme
Court’s take on a similar situation. The Virginia court determined
that an exchange of emails, even if they constituted an active
exchange, were insufficiently close in time to suggest real-time
deliberation. 93 This principle is not specific to Virginia. Generally
speaking, a mere exchange isn’t sufficient; the exchange must occur

90. See, e.g., Johnson v. Nebraska Envtl. Control Council, 509 N.W.2d 21 (Neb. Ct.
App. 1993) (holding that Nebraska open meeting law applied because factual briefings involve
listening to facts, arguments, and statements, and therefore constitute a crucial part of a
governmental body’s decision making).
91. See, e.g., Roberts v. City of Palmdale, 853 P.2d 496, 503 (Cal. 1993) (“[A]
concerted plan to engage in collective deliberation on public business through a series of
letters or telephone calls passing from one member of the governing body to the next would
violate the open meeting requirement.”); Mankato Free Press Co. v. City of N. Mankato, 563
N.W.2d 291, 295 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (“Arguably the effect of the one-on-one interviews
is at odds with the purpose of the Open Meeting Law.”); State ex rel. Mathews v. Shelby Cnty.
Bd. of Comm’rs, 1990 WL 29276, *12–13 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (“The purpose of this [law]
is to prevent public officials from deciding or deliberating public business in chance meetings,
informal assemblages or by electronic communication.”); Eugster v. City of Spokane, 39 P.3d
380, 385 (Wash. 2002) (“[T]he [law] does not require the contemporaneous physical
presence of the Council members in order to constitute a meeting.”).
92. Wood v. Battle Ground Sch. Dist., 27 P.3d 1208, 1218 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
93. See Beck v. Shelton, 593 S.E.2d 195, 198–200 (Va. 2004). For an excellent analysis
of this case, see John F. O’Connor & Michael J. Baratz, Some Assembly Required: The
Application of State Open Meeting Laws to Email Correspondence, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV.
719, 722–23 (2004).
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in such a way that suggests deliberation in real time—what Illinois
law refers to as “contemporaneous interactive communication.” 94
Thus, to an even greater degree than the federal Sunshine Act,
state open meeting laws identify a particular kind of activity—
deliberation—as the trigger requiring public access. 95
3. Common concepts in open meeting laws
Despite their differences—in particular the vast gap between
state open meeting laws that apply to a multitude of governing
bodies and the narrower federal ones—these statutes display a set of
core concepts that reinforce the central role for deliberation. First,
these laws all require certain meetings to be held in full public view
and in real time. They do not recognize as sufficient ex post access
through recordings or minutes; accordingly, they operate on a
concept of access that recognizes only in-person, face-to-face
attendance. In addition, these laws require advance notice of
meetings, permitting the public to submit materials, comments, or
opinions to either the entity or its members in advance of the
meeting. Further, they mandate that decisions be made on the
record, in public. Finally, and most pertinent to this inquiry, they
write deliberation into the very definition of meeting and
consequently into the requirements for public access.

94. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/1.02 (2006); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-200(2)
(2013) (defining meeting as any gathering at which members “discuss or act”); FLA. STAT. §
286.011(1) (2012) (interpreted to include a body’s entire decision-making process as a
meeting); Roberts, 853 P.2d at 503 (holding that California’s Brown Act applies to collective
action, not the passive receipt of e-mail by members absent a concerted plan to engage in
collective deliberation); Times Publ’g Co. v. Williams, 222 So.2d 470, 473 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1969) (“Every thought, as well as every affirmative act, of a public official as it relates to and is
within the scope of his official duties, is a matter of public concern; and it is the entire
decision-making process that the legislature intended to affect by the enactment of the statute
before us.”).
95. See, Stockton Newspapers v. Redevelopment Agency, 214 Cal. Rptr. 561, 564 (Ct.
App. 1985) (citing Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 69
Cal. Rptr. 480, 485–86 (Ct. App. 1968)) (applying open meeting law to deliberation because
it “connotes not only collective discussion but also the ‘collective acquisition and exchange of
facts preliminary to the ultimate decision’”)); Wood v. Marston, 442 So.2d 934, 940 (Fla.
1983) (using the term “discussion stages”) (quoting Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296
So.2d 473, 477 (Fla. 1974)).
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C. The Deliberation Paradox and Administrative Confusion

In its simplest form, the Deliberation Paradox is plain:
deliberation may be kept private in records, but must be open in
meetings. Thus, the paradox might be explained by different
conceptions of what it means for an agency to deliberate.
Alternatively, the paradox could arise because the word (or concept)
of deliberation means different things in the context of records and
meetings. Is the Deliberation Paradox a real conceptual quandary, or
a mere linguistic tic?
1. The paradox in real life
The actual practice of government agencies suggests that the
paradox is a real conundrum, confusing officials about what may be
kept secret and what must be made public.
Consider the example of a commission that holds a public
meeting, but then goes into closed session to get legal advice. When
it emerges, it takes a vote with no further discussion or public
comment. A reporter or other interested party might be suspicious
that something more than mere receipt of legal advice took place in
closed session, and request a copy of minutes from the closed
session. If the minutes do exist, and if they show that the
commission deliberated during the closed session, the minutes might
still be exempt from disclosure because they comprise a record that
reflects the agency’s deliberative process. 96
Consider as well a situation where each member of a five-person
administrative board develops a memorandum summarizing his or
her opinion and analysis of a pending issue. They circulate the
memoranda, which inform each other of the likely vote on the issue,
as well as the reasons supporting it. None of them mentions the
memoranda at the open meeting at which they vote on the pending
issue. Are the memoranda accessible as public records? Probably not,

96. See, e.g., PELTZ-STEELE, supra note 74, at 373 (comparing Multimedia Publ’g of
N.C., Inc., v. Henderson Cnty., 550 S.E.2d 846 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001), with Atl. City
Convention Ctr. Auth. v. S. Jersey Publ’g Co., 637 A.2d 1261 (N.J. 1994)) (A board of
commissioners held a public meeting, then went into closed session. Peltz-Steele explores the
question of whether the minutes or recordings of the executive session are accessible as records.).
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unless they are specifically cited by the board members as used in
conjunction with the vote, in which case they are accessible. 97
One step further: nearly every jurisdiction recognizes the
applicability of open meeting laws to “serial meetings,” in which a
less-than-quorum number of officials communicate in a series, which
eventually adds up to a quorum. 98 Serial meetings can take place in
person or by telephone, but can also take place by record—including
email, instant message, or civic social network (such as Twitter or
Facebook). 99 Government officials’ deliberation via an exchange of
records would be exempt from disclosure under open record law right
up until the point that they can be considered deliberation as applied
by open meeting law (i.e., usually with a quorum and evidence that
the deliberation is going on in real time). In other words, the exact
same exchange taking place over the course of three days might be
exempt, but taking place over the course of an afternoon might trigger
access requirements under open meeting law. 100
As these examples suggest, considerable confusion can arise, in
both the agencies and the courts, 101 especially with regard to
electronic records or civic social media. Concurrently, a thriving
consulting and training industry has arisen to manage electronic
records and provide advice to governments struggling with the
97. See, e.g., 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/7(1)(f) (2014) (“[A] specific record or relevant
portion of a record shall not be exempt when the record is publicly cited and identified by the
head of the public body.”).
98. See Beck, 593 S.E.2d at 198–200 (holding that series of emails can constitute a serial
meeting); Wood v. Battle Ground Sch. Dist., 27 P.3d 1208 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (same).
99. See Bill Sherman, Your Mayor, Your “Friend”: Public Officials, Social Networking, and
the Unmapped New Public Square, 31 PACE L. REV. 95, 110–113 (2011) (discussing various
scenarios in which social media use can inadvertently facilitate open meeting law violations).
100. See Stockton Newspapers, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 564; Wood, 442 So.2d at 940 (Fla. 1983).
101. See, e.g., Duane W. Gang, San Bernardino County Officials Defend Edited CreditCard
Records,
THE
PRESS-ENTERPRISE
(Nov.
15,
2007
7:26
AM),
http://www.boards2go.com/boards/board.cgi?action=read&id=1195158653&user=sbcs&pa
ge=6 (noting that county attorneys redacted names from expense reports, claiming deliberative
process – the notion that protecting the anonymity of his meeting attendees protects his
deliberation); see also Stephen P. Croley & William F. Funk, The Federal Advisory Committee
Act and Good Government, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 451, 512 n.391 (1997). Compare Aviation
Consumer Action Project v. Washburn, 535 F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (using exemption 5 to
justify closing an advisory committee meeting) and Washington Research Project, Inc., v. Dep’t
of Health, Educ., and Welfare, 504 F.2d 238 (upholding nondisclosure of certain advisory
committee documents based on exemption 5) with Wolfe v. Weinberger, 403 F.Supp. 238, 24143 (D.D.C. 1975) (holding exemption 5 inapplicable to internal deliberations of advisory
committee) and Nader v. Dunlop, 370 F. Supp. 177, 177 (D.D.C. 1973) (holding that
exemption 5 does not apply so as to permit exclusion of public).
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complexity of the law. The stakes are high; a violation of open record
law can be compensated by a penalty, plus attorney fees, 102and
government action taken at an illegal meeting is subject to reversal. 103
Thus, government agencies have a single concept of deliberation,
but struggle with its implications.
2. The paradox and the single meaning of “deliberation”
The conclusion that agencies believe that deliberation describes
the same conduct in meetings and records is reinforced by the
conception of deliberation underlying both records and meetings.
Both types of laws aim at the same thing: an exchange of ideas,
proposals, and recommendations that, while presented as part of a
serious discussion, are not yet complete. This is the process of
coming to a decision, when various facts and options are weighed.
Just as deliberative materials are labeled as such under open records
and open meetings laws, non-deliberative materials are subject to the
paradox as well. For example, the deliberative process exemption to
FOIA and state open record laws does not apply to purely factual
material; facts, even when submitted to support a recommendation
or draft, are disclosable under open record laws because they do not
reflect thoughts. 104 Conversely, a purely factual briefing of a body
otherwise covered by an open meeting stature need not be public,
because no deliberation occurs. 105 Consequently, the Deliberation
Paradox cannot be explained by divergent definitions of the word
deliberation, or by divergent definitions of non-deliberative content.
3. The paradox as a binary choice
Furthermore, the Deliberation Paradox cannot be explained as
the result of a single balancing test in which public access and candor

102. See Brian M. Rosenthal, Shoreline Public-Records Case Ends after 7 Years, SEATTLE
TIMES, (June 28, 2013, 9:19 PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/
2021291545_metadataxml.html (recounting public records case with $538,555 verdict, more
than 80 percent of which was an award of attorney fees).
103. See In re Lakewood City Council Members, 30 P.3d 474 (Wash. 2001) (affirming
dismissal of recall petition done secretly); Tovar v. State, 978 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. Crim. App.
1998) (affirming criminal conviction for open meeting violation).
104. See, e.g., Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 1145 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (holding that raw
data was not exempted because they were not “a part of the decisional process”).
105. Equitable Shipyards, Inc. v. State of Wash., 611 P.2d 396 (1980) (holding that
review of materials is not “action” for the purposes of the Open Public Meetings Act).
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are weighed in context, with access winning out in meetings but
candor prevailing in records. The deliberation trigger in public
meetings is at the very core of open meeting laws; it is not the
product of a multifactor test.
The argument goes like this: administrative law is always
balancing the competing values of access, which informs the public,
and secrecy, which permits government actors to speak or write with
candor. That balance, the argument goes, does not hinge on
deliberation, but happens to tilt toward withholding documents in
the records context. 106 If this contention is accurate, then there is no
deliberation paradox; deliberation would be a matter in both
meetings and records, but merely one consideration among many.
This argument carries the seeds of its own unpersuasiveness,
however. If open records laws just happen to balance deliberation
toward secrecy, it is because the statutes identify deliberation as a
statutory exemption to the general rule of open access. The
exemption is not an afterthought, but rather a foundational
characteristic of both federal and state open records laws.
Deliberation though, is not just one factor to be considered in a
balancing test for either records or meetings; rather, it is the
determinative factor. 107 If deliberation were merely one factor among
many, we would expect to see a range of cases in which records
contain some deliberation, but not enough to be exempt from
disclosure, or in which some meetings contain deliberation, but not
of the type of degree to support public access, given the context.
However, such is not the case. The Deliberation Paradox sets up a
binary system: If records reflect an agency’s deliberative process, that
alone moves them from accessible to exempt. If a qualified
government body is deliberating, that alone means that it must do so
106. I am grateful for an email exchange with Richard Peltz-Steele in which he distilled
the essence of this argument.
107. As discussed supra in section I.C., “deliberation” determines whether a “meeting”
has occurred, or whether “action” has taken place. But it is not an accident of language; the
purpose of these laws, as described in both definitions and statements of purpose, often
mentions the word or describes the concept of “deliberations.” See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN.§ 38-431 (1962); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 120/1 (1957) (“[I]t is the intent of this Act
to ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly and that their deliberations be
conducted openly.”); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-1.5-1; MD. CODE ANN. STATE GOV’T §10501(b) (West 1991) (“The ability of the public . . . to attend . . . meetings of public bodies
and to witness the phases of the deliberation . . . ensures the accountability of government to
the citizens of the State.”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-4-401 (1957) (“Certain deliberations and
actions shall be taken openly as provided in this act.”).
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in public (unless some other exemption applies, such as deliberations
in a quasi-judicial capacity).
But if the Deliberation Paradox cannot be explained away as a
semantic difference or a malleable balancing test, where did it come
from? Some answers arise from the history and purposes of open
records and open meeting laws.
II. WHY DELIBERATION DIVERGED
The Deliberation Paradox exists, in part, due to the different
origins of open government doctrine. Open meeting and open
records laws were never part of a single access-to-government
doctrine; rather, they developed in entirely separate areas of the law,
and their operation today reflects their origins. Open records law
may be best understood as a narrow, statutory waiver of sovereign
immunity, still subject to a limited executive privilege due to
separation of powers. Open meeting law, by contrast, is a statutory
manifestation of the common law right of access to the government.
An examination of those origins helps explain the peculiar role of
deliberation and helps identify a possible resolution for the paradox.
A. Open Records Law: From Subpoena Power to Generalized Access by Statute
The common law provided only a very limited right of access to
government records. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries, British courts identified a judicial power to compel
production of government records that were deemed necessary for
certain litigation. In order to gain access, the courts required the
litigant to prove his personal connection to the documents and their
necessity to pursue or defend a court case. The courts would deny
requests if they perceived the litigant to be motivated by malice or
concluded that the documents’ production might harm the dignity
of a government official or agency. A generalized interest in the
documents or their contents would not suffice. 108 Thus, the early
common law right of access to documents was in most respects an
acknowledgment that the government had a duty to respond to a
subpoena duces tecum.
This approach was followed in American courts as well, with
some expansion of the right to include requesters who had an

108. See PELTZ-STEELE, supra note 74, at 125.
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identifiable interest in records, but not an ongoing court case. With
the advent of muckraking journalism and frustration with
government corruption in the Gilded Age, courts began to relax
these requirements. But broad access-upon-request laws were rare.
The right remained largely in the hands of the judiciary, 109 and even
government responses to subpoenas were unreliable. 110 Any such
common-law right has been entirely supplanted by FOIA and state
open records laws.
Concepts of open government law have been vulnerable, though,
to two sovereignty-based critiques: First, sovereign immunity had
permitted the government to resist demands for records. The
adoption of public records statutes, which explicitly or impliedly
waived immunity, rendered this critique obsolete. Second, the
separation of powers doctrine allowed the executive branch to claim
that public records law impermissibly intrudes upon the core
executive function. Although separation of powers-based arguments
have not toppled FOIA and its state counterparts entirely, they do
live on in the form of claims of executive privilege and its specific
application, the deliberative process exemption. 111
With this evolution in mind, one source of the Deliberation
Paradox appears clear: open records law is always battling sovereignty
or separation-of-powers norms that tend to value confidentiality.
B. Open Meeting Law: From Access to Courts to Government in the Sunshine
Like open record law, access to meetings arose in the context of
the courtroom. At a time when British courts were not only
adjudicative bodies but also more general governing entities, the
common law developed a right to access that served democratic and
legitimizing functions: the public could participate in a “moot” and
109. For example, a citizen could examine public records only if the records were “required
by law to be maintained” by the government, and only if the citizen could show a “legitimate
interest,” which often equated with a litigation interest. See Michael C. McClintock, et al.,
Washington’s New Public Records Disclosure Act: Freedom of Information in Municipal Labor Law,
11 GONZ. L. REV. 13, 25, 45–46 (1975). Only a handful of states recognized a common law
right to public documents. See SCHWING, supra note 82, at 2 & n.8.
110. See, e.g., Daniel C. Taylor, Taking Touhy Too Far: Why It Is Improper for Federal
Agencies to Unilaterally Convert Subpoenas into FOIA Requests, 99 GEO. L.J. 1227, 1234–
1237 (2011).
111. See, e.g., Marriott Int’l Resorts, L.P., v. United States, 437 F.3d 1302, 1304–05
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (noting that deliberative process privilege is one of many privileges that
generally fall under the rubric of “executive privilege”).
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courtroom proceedings were open for the world to see. In the words
of the Supreme Court in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia (the
American case establishing the right of public access to the courts):
In the days before the Norman Conquest, cases in England were
generally brought before moots, such as the local court of the
hundred or the county court, which were attended by the freemen
of the community. Somewhat like modern jury duty, attendance at
these early meetings was compulsory on the part of the freemen,
who were called upon to render judgment. 112

Later, the duty of all freemen to participate was relaxed, but
criminal trials generally remained public. Historical sources indicate
that public attendance was thought essential to the quality of the
justice rendered; thus, public access was for the benefit of justice
itself, rather than merely for those seeking access. 113
All indications are that this tradition continued in the colonies,
and remained after they became the United States. 114 The charters of
some of the colonies emphasized open criminal trials as well, and the
rhetoric of the Revolutionary period suggested some pride in this
fact. As the Court in Richmond Newspapers explained:
Looking back, we see that when the ancient “town meeting” form
of trial became too cumbersome, 12 members of the community
were delegated to act as its surrogates, but the community did not
surrender its right to observe the conduct of trials. The people
retained a “right of visitation” which enabled them to satisfy
themselves that justice was in fact being done. 115

It took time, however, for the right of access to court
proceedings to evolve into a more generalized right to attend
meetings of agencies. English common law did not recognize a right
to attend meetings of public entities; rather, legislative debate could
112. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 565 (1980)
(citations omitted).
113. Id. at 566 (citing EDWARD JENKS, THE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 73–74 (6th ed.
1967) (“[O]ne of the most conspicuous features of English justice, that all judicial trials are
held in open court, to which the public have free access, . . . appears to have been the rule in
England from time immemorial.”); see also Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)
(noting that justice must “satisfy the appearance of justice”).
114. See id. at 567 (citing ARTHUR P. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA
129 (1930), and Paul Samuel Reinsch, The English Common Law in the Early American
Colonies, in 1 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 367, 405 (1907)).
115. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572.
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occur in secret, and publication of legislative proceedings could be
outlawed. 116 Secret deliberations were permissible in the early United
States as well. The first Constitutional Convention conducted its
deliberations in private, as did the first Congress (even as it was
considering the Bill of Rights). The Constitution is silent about the
accessibility of meetings in either Congress or the Executive Branch,
and after adoption of the Constitution, the Senate held all sessions in
private until 1794. 117
At the state and local level, where small government bodies such
as councils, commissions, boards, or non-judicial courts met and
exercised power, the antecedents of Richmond Newspapers suggested
a common law access to certain meetings. State laws grew from
statutes ordering access to particular government bodies (like an
1868 Kansas law dealing with school boards 118) and more general
judicial decrees mandating open meetings. 119 Thus, it makes sense
that state open meeting laws largely pre-dated federal statutes like
the Sunshine Act and the Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972
(FACA). But after Alabama adopted the first comprehensive open
meeting law in 1915, states began to follow suit. In 1976, New York
made it unanimous. 120
At the outset, the state laws emphasized open deliberations. For
example, one of the most influential open meeting statutes,
California’s Brown Act, states in its introduction:
In enacting this chapter, the Legislature finds and declares that the
public commissions, boards and councils and the other public
agencies in this State exist to aid in the conduct of the people’s
business. It is the intent of the law that their actions be taken
openly and that their deliberations be conducted openly. The
people of this State do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies
which serve them. The people, in delegating authority, do not give
their public servants the right to decide what is good for the people
to know and what is not good for them to know. The people insist
116. SCHWING, supra note 82, at 1.
117. PELTZ-STEELE, supra note 74, at 4 (citing Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press,” 50
HASTINGS L.J. 705 (1999).
118. KAN. CODE 19-218.
119. See SCHWING, supra note 82, at 3 & n.17.
120. Timothy P. Whelan, New York’s Open Meetings Law: Revision of the Political Caucus
Exemption and Its Implications for Local Government, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1483, 1483 & n.3
(1995) (“When New York enacted the OML in 1976, it became the last state to codify this
commitment to open government.”).
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on remaining informed so that they may retain control over the
instruments they have created. 121

In keeping with this history—and in contrast with state public
records statutes—open meeting laws were framed with an eye toward
public participation in governance. 122 Thus, open meeting laws have
at their core the value of public access to government bodies as they
make decisions—that is, as they deliberate.
Against this historical backdrop, federal open meeting laws were
late arrivals. The Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972 (FACA)
and the Government in the Sunshine Act of 1976 were prompted by
the rising concern about backroom deals and secret negotiations,
culminating in the Watergate scandal. 123 As the D.C. Circuit put it,
A decade ago revelations of secret abuse of official power shocked
this nation and seared in our minds a lesson vital to the health of a
democratic polity: government should conduct the public’s
business in public. In the Sunshine Act Congress moved to ensure
that those in government do not forget that they are above all
accountable to the people of this nation. 124

Like the state laws that preceded and followed, the adoption of
the Sunshine Act and FACA focused not on mere information
distribution, but on the deliberations that characterized a substantial
121. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 54950. The Act goes on to define “meeting” as “any
congregation of a majority of the members of a legislative body at the same time and
location . . . to hear, discuss, deliberate, or take action on any item that is within the subject
matter jurisdiction of the legislative body.” § 54952.2(a). See also MONT. CONST., art. II § 9
(“No person shall be deprived of the right to examine documents or to observe the
deliberations of all public bodies or agencies of state government and its subdivisions, except in
cases in which the demand of individual privacy clearly exceeds the merits of
public disclosure.”).
122. See, e.g., Okla. Ass’n of Mun. Attorneys v. State, 577 P.2d 1310, 1313–14 (Okla.1978)
(“If an informed citizenry is to meaningfully participate in government or at least understand why
government acts affecting their daily lives are taken, the process of decision making as well as the
end results must be conducted in full view of the governed.”). See also FLA. CONST. art. 1, §
24(b) (“All meetings of any collegial public body of the executive branch of state government or
of any collegial public body of a county, municipality, school district, or special district, at which
official acts are to be taken or at which public business of such body is to be transacted or
discussed, shall be open and noticed to the public and meetings of the legislature shall be open
and noticed as provided in Article III, Section 4(e), except with respect to meetings exempted
pursuant to this section or specifically closed by this Constitution.”).
123. See Stephenson, supra note 75, Note, Government in the Sunshine Act, 26 AM. U. L.
REV. 154 (1976).
124. Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 727 F.2d 1195, 1203
(D.C. Cir. 1984).
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meeting. 125 Their content reflects their history; government actions
with the stamp of approval of the public should be observable by the
public, despite the costs, red tape, and side effects, which could
be substantial.
III. THE PURPOSES OF OPEN GOVERNMENT LAW
The Deliberation Paradox might be described as a conflict
between two different approaches to deliberation. For records,
“deliberation” is a content descriptor that identifies an essential
feature of “good” decision making (meaning both objectively better
policy and a process that works smoothly and results in the desired
form of product). In that context, it is also an internal process that
needs space, time, and privacy to function. In meetings,
“deliberation” is the critical work that must be done; it is where the
actual action happens, where minds are changed and differences
settled. The legitimacy of the multi-member body is supported by
the public’s ability to witness the deliberative process.
This approach begs the question whether the purposes of open
government law shed any light on whether the Deliberation Paradox
is unavoidable, or whether it is reconcilable. In other words, are the
purposes of those laws—the goods they seek to promote, the ills they
seek to diminish, and the methods they use—tied to their
treatment of deliberation?
A. Open Government as a Model of Democratic Participation
As a general matter, open government laws seek to enable an
informed citizenry. The necessity of public access to information
about the government in order to make informed voting choices is
nearly a cliché. As James Madison wrote, “A popular Government,
without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a

125. See H.R. REP. NO. 92-1017, at 9 (1972) (stating that the House version of the
FACA bill imposes a “requirement of openness,” which is “designed to assure public access to
deliberations of advisory committees”); S. REP. NO. 92-1098, at 14 (1972) (describing Section
10 of the Senate bill as “establish[ing] the standard of openness in advisory committee
deliberations, and provid[ing] an opportunity for interested parties to present their views and
be informed with respect to the subject matter taken up by such committees”); 118 CONG.
REC. 23, 30274 (1972) (statement of Sen. Percy) (“The second major element of the bill is its
provisions for opening up advisory committees to public scrutiny.”). See also Henry H. Perritt,
Jr., & James A. Wilkinson, Open Advisory Committees and the Political Process: The Federal
Advisory Committee Act After Two Years, 63 GEO. L.J. 725, 737 (1975).
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Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both.” 126 But, as with
many clichés, it grew from a simple truth: there is great value to
informing the public about the government. And, to the extent that
public participation in government is desired, open meetings and
records are a must. 127
The ideal of democratic deliberation is probably best typified by
Jürgen Habermas’s conception of “the public sphere,” where people
collectively may form public opinion in an environment without the
interference of the government or the economy. 128 But in practical
terms, open government laws are necessary to provide the sort of
information that makes the formation of valid opinions possible. And
beyond those lofty aims, open government can serve more limited
goals. Public access can help reduce (or dilute or compete with) the

126. James Madison, Letter to W.T. Barry, August 4, 1822 (in WRITINGS 9:103—9).
There appears to be a requirement that this quote from Madison appear in every publication
dealing with open government law. See, e.g., Glenn Dickinson, The Supreme Court’s Narrow
Reading of the Public Interest Served by the Freedom of Information Act, 59 U. CIN. L. REV.
191, 194 n.23 (1990); Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 895
(2006); Sean Hill, Sunshine in Indian Country: A Pro-FOIA View of Klamath Water Users, 32
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 463, 471 (2008); John Moon, The Freedom of Information Act: A
Fundamental Contradiction, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1157 (1985); W. Alan Kailer, Note, The
Release of Private Information Under Open Records Laws, 55 TEX. L. REV. 911, 913 n.17
(1977); Gregory L. Waples, Note, The Freedom of Information Act: A Seven-Year Assessment,
74 COLUM. L. REV. 895 n.1 (1974).
127. Steven Aftergood, Reducing Government Secrecy: Finding What Works, 27 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 399, 399 (2009) (“[T]he free flow of information to interested members of the
public is a prerequisite to their participation in the deliberative process and to their ability to hold
elected officials accountable.”); Wendy Wagner, Katherine Barnes & Lisa Peters, Rulemaking in
the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 100
(2011) (“Open government and equal access to decision making processes are cornerstones that
ensure an accountable and democratically legitimate Fourth Branch.”).
128. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC
SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY (Thomas Burger trans.,
1989) (1962). Deliberative democracy is a burgeoning topic in political theory, and more
recently in law and democracy. See, e.g., 12 ELECTION L. J. 1 et seq. (2013) (issue dedicated to
articles about deliberative democracy and election law). Deliberative democracy can be
distinguished from administrative deliberation in that it focuses on deliberation among citizens
rather than within agencies. See, e.g., Stephen Tierney, Using Electoral Law to Construct a
Deliberative Referendum: Moving Beyond the Democratic Paradox, 12 ELECTION L. J. 508
(2013). They do share, however, a focus on “communicative action” as an interaction in which
the participants are only oriented toward reaching understanding, and are only motivated by
the “force of the better argument.” Jürgen Habermas, Discourse Ethics, Notes on a Program of
Philosophical Justification, in MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 89
(Christian Lenhardt & Shierry W. Nicholsen trans. 1990).
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influence of special interests. 129 The awareness of public scrutiny can
prompt government officials to improve their performance, better
justify their actions, and ensure the appearance of fairness. 130
Lawmakers recognize, however, that open government comes at
a cost. Actually, three costs: First, the actual monetary cost incurred
by staff who must respond to records requests and public meeting
requirements. Second, the loss of efficiency and speed that
accompanies additional requirements, procedures, and red tape. 131
And third, the secondary effects on agency activity: diminished
collegiality at agencies, reduced flow of opinions and proposals,
diverted attention and concern for records produced. 132 Thus,
lawmakers attempt to balance transparency and public participation
with efficiency and celerity, and deliberation suffers. 133
B. Purposes of Open Records Laws
1. The virtue of public access to records
Open record laws are the archetypal access-to-government laws.
They allow the public to peer behind closed doors to see evidence of
the behavior of government officials. They allow one to perceive
mistruths, acquire objective information, and root out waste, fraud,
and abuse. They can answer the question “what did the government
know, and when did it know it?”
The specific means by which the public becomes informed,
however, are worth a closer look. Most people will go their entire
lives without filing a public records request. But open records laws
129. See Rossi, supra note 13, at 202 (“[P]luralism in administrative decisionmaking runs
the risk of powerful factions securing deals in legislation or regulations at the expense of
smaller, more isolated (and perhaps more vulnerable) groups.”).
130. This finding should not surprise; the awareness that one is being watched has a
strong impact on behavior. See, e.g., HENRY A. LANDSBERGER, HAWTHORNE REVISITED
(1958) (discussing the famous Hawthorne experiments of lighting and other worker
conditions in factories); Valerie A. Curtis, Lisa O. Danquah, & Robert V. Aunger, Planned,
Motivated, and Habitual Hygiene Behaviour: An Eleven Country Review, 24(4) HEALTH
EDUC. RES. 655 (2009) (finding that people were more likely to wash their hands after using
the bathroom if they were being observed).
131. See, e.g., Jennifer Shkabatur, Transparency With(out) Accountability: Open
Government in the United States, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 79 (2012).
132. See discussion infra section III.B.2.
133. See Cary Coglianese, Heather Kilmartin, & Evan Mendelson, Transparency and
Public Participation in the Federal Rulemaking Process: Recommendations for the New
Administration, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 924, 927–28 (2009).
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do enable an informed citizenry because they allow citizen proxies,
such as reporters, candidates for office, or litigants, to find and
distribute information that may have community-wide value. The
public, therefore, benefits as a whole from the incentives that such
laws provide these individual intermediaries (i.e., allowing the
reporter to draw more readers, the candidate to advance her
campaign, the litigant to gain an advantage in his lawsuit). In that
way, open record laws offer the opportunity to hold public officials
accountable for statements, actions, and results.
By providing for citizen suits, penalties, and attorney fees, they
also seek to prevent public officials from keeping secrets without
good reason. The opportunity to keep secrets without sanction
opens the door to moral hazard, and experience has shown that
when permitted to keep secrets, the government probably will,
whether for a legitimate reason or an improper one. 134
In some ways, public records laws aim to address the fear that
government (or government officials) will try to avoid responsibility
or fault for mistakes; that is, that secret government records allows
officials to better hide corruption. To the extent that government
decisions might be made in a way, and by people, obscured from
public view, we expect open records law to be useful in identifying
and preventing that behavior.
2. The vice of access and the purpose of the deliberative process exemption
Granting all the virtues of public access to records, it still makes
intuitive sense that the government cannot accomplish certain
functions in full public view. The deliberative process exemption is
based on the notion that one of those functions is the deceptively
complex process of making a decision. The deliberative process
exemption seeks to carve out a space in which an agency can weigh
options, seek advice, and, when a decision has been made, speak with
a coherent voice.
Federal and state caselaw identifies three goals for administrative
governance that justify the deliberative process exemption: (1) to
encourage open, frank discussions among staff, and between staff
134. One particularly pernicious example is the efforts to shield from scrutiny a record of
maintenance trouble on the B-29 bomber, improperly hidden under the “state secrets”
exemption to FOIA. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); Herring v. United
States, 424 F.3d 384 (3d Cir. 2005); BARRY SIEGEL, CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE (2008) (all
discussed in PELTZ-STEELE, supra note 74, at 237).
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and their superiors; (2) to avoid early disclosure of proposed policies
before they are actually adopted; and (3) to protect against public
confusion that might result from disclosure of arguments, reasons
and rationales that were not in fact the final basis for an agency’s
action. 135 In other words, “the purpose of the deliberative privilege is
to afford government officials not only the freedom to ‘debate
alternative approaches in private,’ but also the ‘freedom
to’ deliberate.” 136
Courts applying this exemption tend to take it as a given that
secrecy will help the deliberative process. In California, “[t]he
purpose of the exemption is to provide a measure of agency privacy
for written discourse concerning matters pending administrative
action.” 137 Thus, the reasoning goes, better decisions will be made,
and will be made at lower cost and with less hassle.
C. Purposes of Open Meeting Laws
1. The virtue of access to government deliberation in real time
Open meeting laws target a different type of access to
government, and therefore are constructed differently than open
record laws. For example, whereas an open record law grants access
to records that already exist, an open meeting law cannot open a
meeting that already occurred. Rather, the law operates as a set of
requirements for meetings, and then offers an ex post remedy for
violation (penalties, attorney fees, rescission of government action at

135. See, e.g., Kidd v. Dep’t of Justice, 362 F.Supp.2d 291, 296 (D.D.C. 2005)
(protecting documents on basis that disclosure would “inhibit drafters from freely exchanging
ideas, language choices, and comments in drafting documents”) (internal quotation marks
omitted); Heggestad v. Dep’t of Justice, 182 F.Supp.2d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2000) (protecting
memoranda containing recommendations based on perjured testimony, finding that they “have
no probative value to the public since they are based on misrepresentations”); Am. Fed’n of
Gov’t Empls. v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 63 F.Supp.2d 104, 108 (D. Mass. 1999)
(holding that release of predecisional documents “could cause harm by providing the public
with erroneous information”); Russell v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 682 F.2d 1045, 1048 (D.C.
Cir. 1982); Coastal States Gas Corp. v. DOE, 617 F.2d 854, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Jordan v.
Dep’t of Justice, 591 F.2d 753, 772–73 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
136. Judicial Watch of Fla., Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 102 F.Supp.2d 6, 14 (D.D.C.
2000). For a discussion of the impact of public participation in regulatory deliberation, see
Stuart W. Shulman, Whither Deliberation? Mass E-Mail Campaigns and U.S. Regulatory
Rulemaking, 3 J. E-GOV’T 41, 58 (2006).
137. Citizens for a Better Env’t v. Dep’t of Food & Agric., 217 Cal. Rptr. 504, 509 (1985).
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the improper meeting, and possibly personal liability). 138 The
remedies, though, are insufficient to fully correct a violation. Once a
meeting has occurred in violation of the law, the participants cannot
in any real way rewind their decision-making process to the moment
before the noncompliant discussion occurred; one cannot un-ring
the bell.
So if open meeting laws serve a primarily deterrent function,
what model of public access to meetings do they aim to implement?
One influential treatise notes that “[t]he overriding public policy is
that government is the public’s business and should be conducted in
public so that the basis and rationale for governmental decisions as
well as the decisions themselves are easily accessible to the people.” 139
But the specific requirements of open meeting laws demonstrate that
very particular policy judgments underlie this broad policy.
First, open meeting laws put great value on direct public viewing
of government process. Access to minutes or to a recording of the
meeting is not sufficient. Neither is access through an intermediary,
like a reporter. This aspect of meeting law appears aimed at ensuring
a government official’s personal accountability to the public; the
ability to individually witness an official’s actions is paramount.
Second, open meeting laws prioritize public access to
deliberation itself in real time. Thus, public access is not merely
informational; it must also be either participatory or otherwise
encompass the possibility that a public presence may have an effect
on the deliberation itself.
This interpretation of the real time aspect of open meeting laws
finds support in the Richmond Newspapers cases, which reasoned that
public access to courtrooms has a salutary effect on the conduct of
the people involved in a court case. 140 The importance of public
access to real-time deliberations in public meetings suggests that
public scrutiny adds value to the deliberation itself, and that the
value is something that would be absent were the deliberations only

138. In extreme cases, there can be criminal liability for open meeting violations. See,
e.g., Tovar v. State, 978 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (affirming a criminal conviction
for open meeting violation).
139. SCHWING, supra note 82, at 22–23. By implication, this justification suggests that lateravailable public records cannot fully convey the content of a multi-party decision-making process.
140. Discussed supra note 106 et seq.
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available after the fact (say, by audio or video recording, or
by transcript). 141
Third, some open meeting laws require that the government
offer the public some opportunity to comment. The opportunity to
comment, not only after the fact but in real time, suggests the
possible impact of the comments on subsequent agency action. Also
at work is a concept of fairness, in the sense that the public,
especially people who deem themselves affected by the government
action, should be able to speak or watch while power is
being exercised.
In this way, open meeting law emphasizes the integrity of the
decision-making process. Open meeting law proceeds on the
assumption that the decision-making process can only be fair if it
considers everything, and everyone, brought to it. Thus, its structure
and supporting reasoning reflects the same values as deference-todeliberation doctrines such as Chevron, and arbitrary and capricious
standards of review as well.
2. The vice of formality: The persistent call for a deliberative process
exemption to open meeting laws
Commentators have railed against open meeting laws for their
chilling effect on intra-agency discussions. Richard J. Pierce, author
of the definitive Administrative Law Treatise, makes the case:
[The Government in the Sunshine Act] renders collegiality
impossible in a collegial body that heads an agency. . . . Because of
GSA, meetings among members of multi-member agencies are
infrequent; such agencies often make important decisions through
notational voting with no prior deliberation; and communications
at open meetings are grossly distorted by the presence of the
public. Commissioners are reluctant to express their true views for
fear that they will expose their ignorance or uncertainty with
respect to issues of fact, policy, and laws. They attempt to disguise
their uncertainties with stilted and contrived discussions that
greatly impede the kind of frank exchange of views that is essential
to high-quality decisionmaking by a collegial body . . . . It is highly
unlikely, for instance, that the Supreme Court would have issued its
141. Interestingly, the argument that people act differently when they know they are being
observed is made in both the open records and the open meetings context. In meetings, the
argument is that scrutiny prompts better behavior; in records, that it renders people uncandid,
and therefore results in inferior decision making. See also sources cited supra note 128.
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unanimous, bold decision in Brown v. Board of Education . . . if the
Justices had been required to conduct the decade-long debate that
preceded Brown only in public meetings. . . . It is tempting to
indulge the cynical assumption that Congress enacted GSA for the
purpose of crippling multimember agencies. Whatever may have
been Congress’s intent, GSA certainly has that effect. 142

Other scholars have brought a related critique to other types of
public participation in agency action: “[M]ass participation, while
sometimes beneficial to agency legitimacy, may in certain
circumstances impair deliberation, which many contemporary
administrative theorists perceive as an equally important function of
administrative law . . . . [A]s has often been observed in the context
of open meeting laws, it may impair collegiality and chill deliberation
in multimember agencies.” 143 The Administrative Conference of the
United States has repeatedly attacked open meetings for the same
reasons. 144 One attempt to strike a middle ground proposes that
agencies subject to open meeting laws be permitted to have predecisional discussions in private, but still be required to hold votes
and present statements of reasons in public. 145
None of these proposed amendments have been pursued in any
jurisdiction. This is not merely because is it politically unpalatable to
oppose openness in government, 146 but because these proposals fail
to take into account the central role that deliberation plays in the
purpose and structure of open meetings. After all, deliberation is a
definitional part of meetings themselves. 147 To create a deliberative
process exemption for open meetings would be tantamount to
repeal. Hence the paradox.
142. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 392 (5th ed. 2010).
143. Rossi, supra note 13, at 178, 180. Rossi concludes that, “[t]o the extent that
deliberative democratic ideals are important to agency decision-making, mass participation may
make their pursuit impractical.” Id. at 180.
144. See, e.g., ACUS Recommendation 84-3 (1984); Special Committee, Administrative
Conference of the United States, Report & Recommendation by the Special Committee to
Review the Government in the Sunshine Act, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 421, 421-22 (1997) (listing
ways in which open-meeting requirements can inhibit communications at affected meetings);
Rossi, supra note 13, at 233 (“The Sunshine Act inadvertently transforms multiheaded
agencies into entities which tend to function as if headed by a number of individual,
independently-acting members.”).
145. See Nicholas Johnson, Open Meetings and Closed Minds: Another Road to the
Mountaintop, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 11 (2004).
146. Rossi, supra note 13.
147. This topic is discussed at length in Section I.C, supra.
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D. The Deliberation Paradox Should be Revisited in Light of
Developments in Open Government Law
The different purposes and operation of open record and open
meeting laws suggest a set of common principles that may shed light
on the dual valence of deliberation. To a certain extent, open
government law is a tangle of contradictions, expectations, and
aspirations for our government. Ideally, we want government
officials to speak with as much candor as possible, and we want to
see it, and we want the fact that we can see it not to affect the extent
to which they speak with candor. 148 Thus, our policy reflects the
hope (or naïve assumption) that deliberative bodies are not
distracted or hindered by public access, or if they are, it is worth it.
By this reasoning, public scrutiny or presence is just something that
comports with democratic values: it’s public government, public tax
dollars, public power delegated to the government, so the public
should be able to access the government. Any limit to public access
must be accompanied by a justification.
At the same time, open government law as a whole recognizes
the value of candor, and in particular reflects a judgment that
decisionmakers who are accountable for agency decisions should be
able to receive frank advice from subordinates. Similarly, the laws
acknowledge the necessity of public participation and public scrutiny
at the point that a public official exerts power.
But both types of laws, then, seek to hold an agency to public
scrutiny when it acts as an agency. Thus, open government laws
uniformly value accountability, but accountability operates differently
when applied to an agency led by a single executive or to a
government unit that acts under the direction of a council, board,
or commission.
An individual agency chief is accountable for his or her decisions;
open record law does not seek to hold that person accountable for
things considered but not done. We expect an agency chief might
aim to make a decision after hearing all sides, and allowing
subordinates to make risky or potentially embarrassing arguments;
perhaps it is appropriate to withhold those arguments because only
the agency chief is individually responsible for the agency’s final
148. At a recent lecture on Open Government Law, I polled the audience on whether
Julian Assange, of Wikileaks, was a hero or a villain. A large plurality raised their hands when I
offered the option of “creepy guy, but I’m kind of glad he did what he did.”
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decision. In fact, one of the most valued traits of a public official is
the ability to weigh options, and to hear even unorthodox or
outlandish arguments, but settle on one option that he or she can
stand behind publicly. Part of that process envisions the exchange of
memoranda among subordinates who are not individually
accountable for the agency’s final decision.
A collegial body, on the other hand—one subject to an open
meetings act—can only exercise government authority collectively. No
individual member of a body subject to an open meetings law can take
government action without convening the body and deliberating in
some way, however briefly. Accordingly, the collegial body governance
ideal is more closely tied to interactions among members of the body,
as well as the significance of public access, and the potential for that
access to affect the meeting participants’ vote or decision. Thus, open
government law holds agency officials subject to open meeting laws
only when they exercise collective authority, and particularly when
they interact with each other in a way that can affect the final decision
or action of the collectively led agency.
Thus, open government law does not require scrutiny of
deliberation until an official’s decision-making process begins to
affect other members of a deliberative body. Typically, the
deliberative process of an agency with a unitary chief will allow
internal deliberation to remain private. 149 The exercise of influence,
including the transmission of arguments, opinions, and efforts at
persuasion or deal-making makes the interaction between principals a
use of government power that renders it open to scrutiny in real time
under open meeting law. 150
This view of agency accountability makes sense, but it is
destabilized by the development of interagency consultation and
joint policy development. Officials consult across multiple agencies

149. As I argue infra, this typical model of agency decision making begins to break
down in a modern context, where agencies act in concert, but not as a collective agency. I
argue below in Section IV.C that documents reflecting deliberation among agencies should not
be protected under the deliberative process privilege.
150. It would be shortsighted, however, to portray public access to records as an obstacle to
high-quality deliberation. In fact, named authorship of disclosed predecisional records may have a
positive impact on the excellence of the final product. Seen this way, the iterative and discursive
nature of a written deliberative process can improve both quality and legitimacy, but only if it can
be seen by the public. This argument is laid out well in Shapiro, supra note 12, at 498.
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(and are often required to do so). 151 Decisions, then, are based not
only on recommendations of subordinates, but recommendations of
peer agencies, or of officials with special responsibility for a particular
policy area. For example, a deliberative process about a highway
project may take into account recommendations from the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service, or a lean management consultant, 152 or a labor
negotiator. 153 This is especially true in an era of cooperative
federalism, where federal agencies work with (or over) state agencies
in the implementation of federal statutes. Where uncooperative
federalism arises—that is, there is competition or resistance between
the two levels—the communication between the two is certainly
deliberative (in that it consists of notes, recommendations, etc.) but
occurs between two different officials who are accountable to
different audiences (e.g., one national, one state). 154
If the purposes of open government law find shared principles in
accountability for the exercise of power, then two significant
implications arise. First, the deliberative process exemption to public
records law should no longer apply to inter-agency memoranda,
because exercise of power among distinct and individually accountable
government entities should be public. And, second, the deference

151. For example, the Endangered Species Act requires covered agencies to consult with
the Secretary of the Interior. § 7(a)(1), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(e)(3). The National Environmental
Policy Act regulations require coordination with other agencies. 40 CFR § 1501.6. Other federal
statutes that allow implementation by state agencies require coordination among related agencies.
See Jason Marisam, Interagency Administration, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 183 (2013); Jason Marisam,
The Interagency Marketplace, 96 MINN. L. REV. 886 (2012).
State agencies face similar consultation requirements. For example, Washington State’s
marijuana legalization statute requires the state Liquor Control Board to consult with the state
Department of Agriculture in “establishing classes of marijuana, useable marijuana, and
marijuana-infused products . . . .” RCW 69.50.345(8).
152. See, e.g., David Krings, Dave Levine, & Trent Wall, The Use of “Lean” in Local
Government, ICMA PUBLIC MANAGEMENT (PM) MAGAZINE, 88:8 (Sept. 2006); U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, LEAN IN GOVERNMENT STARTER KIT: HOW TO
IMPLEMENT SUCCESSFUL LEAN INITIATIVES AT ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCIES, VERSION 2.0, at
5 (2009).
153. See ACLU v. City of Seattle, 89 P.3d 295, 297 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (in which the
city argued that communications between the city and a union during arms-length
negotiations were documents reflecting the city’s internal deliberative process).
154. See, e.g., ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN 352 (2011) (in
assessing state-federal policy negotiations, arguing that “[a]ccountability review should ensure
that the process by which a bargain was reached was sufficiently transparent”).
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enjoyed (and earned) by an agency’s deliberation should be closely
linked to the public’s ability to observe that deliberation. 155
IV. THE DELIBERATION PARADOX AND DEFERENCE IN THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
If the Deliberation Paradox poses doctrinal problems for
government agencies, its practical effects display a deeper disconnect
with deliberation-based rationales for deference to agency
interpretations of law.
A. The Deliberation Paradox Confuses Agencies about their
Obligations under Open Government Law
The deliberation-based contradiction between open records and
open meeting laws has posed a significant problem for government
agencies attempting to comply with the law. This is particularly true
where records and meetings begin to merge. For example, an email
is a record, and thus is exempt from disclosure under open records
law if it reflects the agency’s deliberative process. But the same email,
sent among a quorum of a covered government body, can violate
open meeting law if the email chain is the functional equivalent to a
meeting. Another example: a purely factual briefing of council
members is not a meeting, and therefore can be closed to the public.
But if, instead of a briefing, the identical factual content was
distributed on paper, the record could not be kept secret because it
contains only raw data, not deliberation.
Recently, agencies have struggled with applying this
contradiction to the activity of government officials on social media.
Because public officials can read and respond to each other’s tweets,
blog posts, and Facebook updates in real time, they may engage in
communication that cannot be neatly categorized as either meeting
or record.
Consider this hypothetical. City Councilmember Jones posts his
opposition to the mayor’s public safety policy on Facebook. Among
two dozen reader comments are the following: Councilmember
Nguyen clicks the “like” button on the post—signaling to all readers
that he agrees with Councilmember Jones; Councilmember Diaz
155. See, e.g., Seidenfeld, supra note 25, at 501–502 (discussing the conflict between
easing “hard look” review and demanding agency deliberation, because an agency is more
careful and fair when aware of possible judicial scrutiny).
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comments on the post that she thinks the mayor’s policy does not go
far enough; Councilmember Rogers writes that he disagrees with
Councilmember Jones but is open to persuasion; and
Councilmember O’Connor links to Councilmember Jones’s post on
her own Facebook page and comments that the entire question is
moot because the public safety budget is strapped.
Is this an exchange of deliberative documents, or a city council
meeting in violation of the law? The moment that the number of
participants reaches a quorum, it is probably both. 156
Government agencies have adapted by both over- and underdesignating deliberations in meetings in an attempt to preserve
public access to decision making, but to also permit regular
government activities to occur without triggering open meeting
requirements. By some accounts, in-person deliberation at open
meetings has become rarer; a hearing, board, or commission meeting
may be only a formality after smaller pre-meetings have taken place
and the outline or direction of discussion has been chosen. 157 That is
not to say that real time deliberation does not happen, but it does
raise the question whether it should continue to be treated
differently than pre-meeting deliberation on paper, or in a public
records setting. Courts faced with attempting to reconcile the
differences have a difficult task. 158 In some cases, such as the social
media context discussed above, the distinction between meetings
and records can break down entirely. 159
Individual officials have adapted, as well. The deliberation trigger
for open meetings has not been successful in daylighting government
officials’ thought processes; it has merely ensured that officials meet in
sequence to avoid public meeting requirements, or rely on staff-level
discussions to vet any policy disagreements or compromises before
they are aired publicly. It also pushes any deliberative discussion onto
paper, where it is more likely to be exempt from disclosure.
156. In the majority of states, that is; some states use a number other than the quorum to
determine the existence of a meeting. See SCHWING, supra note 82, at 465 et seq. For a further
exploration of open government law and online civic social networks, see Sherman, supra note
99, at 110 (discussing, inter alia, the above example).
157. See Pierce, supra note 142, at 392.
158. See, e.g., Cape Coral Med. Ctr., Inc. v. News-Press Publ’g Co., 390 So.2d 1216, 1218
n.5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (“As the policy behind chapter 119 [the public records act] and
the policy behind section 286.011 [open meeting law] are similar, we believe that they should be
read in parimateria.”); News & Observer Publ’g Co. v. Poole, 412 S.E.2d 7, 14 (1992).
159. See Sherman, supra note 99.

456

`SHERMAN.FINV2 (DO NOT DELETE)

413

11/23/2015 3:52 PM

The Deliberation Paradox and Administrative Law

Governments have adapted to use the inaccessibility of records, as
well. For, although public employees are often told to expect less
privacy (“don’t write it down unless you want it on the front page of
the paper”), 160 governments routinely over-designate deliberativeprocess documents, demonstrating that the privilege exists not only to
protect deliberations, but to allow more secrecy as a general matter. 161
It seems that governmental secrecy is hydraulic; like water, it will
flow wherever it is least restricted. 162
B. Subterranean Deliberation and Directed Deliberation Require a
New Model of Public Access
Even considering the adaptive habits of government agencies,
deliberative processes have changed enormously since the spread of
open government laws. The deliberative rulemaking process has
moved far beyond the notice-comment-response pattern
standardized by the Administrative Procedure Act. The
government’s deliberation starts long before the publication of a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, and proceeds inside an agency,
outside an agency, and among agencies. 163
Furthermore, the increasing complexity of administrative decisions
renders public comment inadequate to address serious questions or
disagreements. A public comment period is more likely to be a staged
opportunity to demonstrate political organization or muscle, rather
than to gather testimony to be used to help craft policy. 164
160. See, e.g., Foster Pepper Mun. Grp., Web 2.0: Staying Out of the Headlines, LOC.
OPEN GOV’T BLOG (July 28, 2009), http://www.localopengovernment.com/2009/
07/articles/web-20/web-20-staying-out-of-the-headlines/ (blog post of law firm advising
local governments on open government law).
161. Courts often permit expansive use of the deliberative process exemption, allowing it
to be used to shield purely factual material. See, e.g., Dudman Commc’ns Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t
of Air Force, 815 F.2d 1565, 1568 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Mead Data Cent. Inc. v. Dep’t of Air
Force, 566 F.2d 242, 256 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Train, 491 F.2d 63, 71
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
162. The metaphor is borrowed from Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The
Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705 (1999).
163. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Administrative Law as Blood Sport: Policy Erosion in
a Highly Partisan Age, 61 DUKE L.J. 1671 (2012) (noting that advocates have started to
lobby and litigate agencies long before the formal decision-making process begins).
164. Id. (citing Wendy Wagner, Katherine Barnes, & Lisa Peters, Rulemaking in the
Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 110–
13 (2011) (describing the “opportunity for imbalanced interest group input into
rulemakings . . . during the formative development of a proposed rule”) and Marissa Martino
Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process: Who Participates? Whose Votes Get Heard?,
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The changes in agency deliberation are not limited to voluntary
adjustments in agency and stakeholder behavior. Federal and state
administrative law no longer leaves an agency to its own judgment
about the factors to consider, how to consider them, or the manner
in which supporting data is gathered and incorporated into the
process of deliberation. Legislative- and executive-led reforms have
imposed requirements for very specific types of deliberation—what I
call “directed deliberation.” The National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) of 1969 165 requires the government to consider
“environmental amenities and values.” The Regulatory Flexibility
Act 166 requires the consideration of “reporting, recordkeeping and
other compliance requirements.” The Paperwork Reduction Act 167
adds awareness of “the paperwork burden for individuals, small
businesses, educational and nonprofit institutions, Federal
contractors, State, local and tribal governments, and other persons
resulting from the collection of information by or for the Federal
Government.” The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 168 ensures that
an agency consider “the expenditure [of funds] by State, local, and
tribal governments . . . .” The National Technology Transfer and
Advancement Act 169 requires agencies to “consult with voluntary,
private sector, consensus standards bodies,” and “when such
participation is in the public interest and is compatible with agency
and departmental missions, authorities, priorities, and budget
resources, [to] participate with such bodies in the development of
technical standards.” Executive Orders such as E.O. 12866 170 require
covered agencies to consider a substantial number of other issues as
well, such as costs and benefit and conflicts among statutes and rules.
An agency ignores directed deliberation at its peril, particularly
where the mandate is enforceable by citizen-suit, or where

8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 245, 252–53 (1998) (finding that “business commenters”
dominate the rulemaking process at the EPA and the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, submitting between 66.7 and 100 percent of the comments).
165. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).
166. 5 U.S.C. §§ 601–603.
167. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3520.
168. 2 U.S.C. chs. 17A, 25.
169. 15 U.S.C. § 272.
170. 3 C.F.R. 638 §§ 2–4 (1993).
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compliance is centrally monitored,
such
as
by
OIRA’s
administration of E.O. 12866 at the federal level. 171
The proliferation of directed deliberation demonstrates that the
politically accountable branches of the government do not trust
agencies to deliberate properly without intensive supervision. The
interaction of these deliberation requirements and open record laws
has not assisted their consistent application. For example, the Eighth
Circuit held that an intra-agency memorandum commenting on a
draft environmental impact statement could be secret, even though
its production might be essential to assessing the agency’s
compliance with NEPA. The court stated that “[a]lthough [the
National Environmental Policy Act] contemplates public
participation . . . NEPA’s statutory language specifically indicates
that disclosure to the public is to be in accord with FOIA,
which includes Exemption 5.” 172
This clash suggests that the deliberative process exemption is
outmoded in light of directed deliberation and inter-agency
consultation. Where the politically accountable branches have
imposed directed deliberation, the requirements are bound to be less
effective if draft documents and internal memoranda documenting
the agency’s efforts to comply with those requirements are off-limits.
Deliberative documents include reliable evidence about whether the
government has sufficiently followed the law. To allow the
government to withhold deliberative materials is to omit from the
public dialogue facts about the agency’s decision-making process,
even where certain types of deliberation are required by law.
C. Consultative Deliberation Across Separate Agencies Demands
Public Scrutiny
Relatedly, government agencies find themselves consulting with
other agencies, or cooperating on rulemakings or other types of

171. Some directed deliberation is spottily enforced, especially in state governments. See,
e.g., WASH. STATE AUDITOR, REGULATORY REFORM: COMMUNICATING REGULATORY
INFORMATION AND STREAMLINING BUSINESS RULES, REP. NO. 1008276 (Sept. 6, 2012),
available at http://www.sao.wa.gov/auditreports/auditreportfiles/ar1008276.pdf.
172. Missouri v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 147 F.3d 708, 710–11 (8th Cir. 1998). See
also Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 861 F.2d 1114, 1120–21 (9th Cir. 1988)
(protecting draft forest plans and preliminary draft environmental impact statements); Chem.
Mfrs. Ass’n v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 600 F. Supp. 114, 118 (D.D.C. 1984)
(protecting preliminary scientific data generated in connection with study of chemical).
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administrative action. Sometimes this is required by statute 173 or by
executive order; 174 in other circumstances, an agency may, on its own
initiative, seek external government expertise. 175 Thus, the
conventional model of deliberation—involving a single agency
poring over candid opinions from subordinates and mulling options
outside of the glare of public scrutiny—no longer dominates in a
world where many policies require cross-agency coordination at high
levels. 176 In the current environment, it is more difficult to
distinguish the exchange of recommendations and opinions and
expert advice among agencies from the same sort of exchange on a
government council, board or commission whose interactions trigger
open meeting requirements. When the Department of the Interior
informs the Department of Transportation that a highway project
may endanger the environment, the exchange gains nothing, and
loses much, from concealment from public view.
In a time of legislative gridlock, administrative agencies often seek
to solve problems that arise either between or across agencies’
designated subject areas. Regulators who work in those areas—an
example might be in regulation of genetically modified organisms across
the Department of Agriculture, the Food and Drug Administration,
and other agencies—deal with jurisdictional uncertainty between
agencies (or between federal, state, and local governments).177 To the
extent that those officials can be held accountable, the process of
interagency negotiation must be transparent.
The issue of cross-agency consultation has implications for other
areas of law as well, but those implications can only be recognized if
that consultation is open to public view, and not hidden behind
FOIA’s deliberative process exemption. For example, the Supreme
173. See, e.g., The Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536 (1973).
(requiring consultation with the Secretary of the Interior, and by implication with the Fish and
Wildlife Service).
174. Exec. Order No. 12866 is one prominent example.
175. See also Marisam, The Interagency Marketplace, supra note 151; Aziz Z. Huq, The
Institution Matching Canon, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 417 (2012) (noting that deference doctrines
depend on a match of agency subject matter and statutory topic).
176. The same is true of agency interaction with the public during rulemakings. See
Cynthia R. Farina et al., Rulemaking in 140 Characters or Less: Social Networking and Public
Participation in Rulemaking, 31 PACE L. REV. 382, 436–37 (2011) (observing that
rulemaking agencies must demonstrate “regulatory rationality,” regardless of
other circumstances).
177. See RYAN, supra note 152, at 266–67, 352 (discussing “accountability review” of
cross-agency and state-federal negotiation).
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Court majority in Oregon v. Gonzales rejected the attorney general’s
attempt to exert authority over assisted suicide. But the Court’s
analysis might look different if the attorney general’s decision had
emerged from a “consultative, formal process in which the views of
the secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services were
solicited and given determinative weight.” 178 And that process could
only be analyzed if it were disclosed.
D. Deference Doctrines and the Breakdown of the Deliberation Paradox
The development of directed deliberation and consultative
deliberation increases the stakes for judicial deference to agency action
because the agency’s obligations multiply and the agency’s ability to
make law expands. But those are not the only developments.
First, directed deliberation makes it harder for an agency to act,
or act nimbly. The ossifying effects of these super-APA requirements
on rulemakings have been well documented. 179 They render it very
difficult to make, amend, or repeal a rule. They create a strong bias
in favor of the status quo. They make it more likely that an agency
will pursue its goals by other methods, thus frustrating the goals of
directed deliberation in the first place. But they also have an
important effect on deliberation. By requiring an agency to conduct
a number of types of pre-decisional analyses, these requirements
encourage the agency to develop a record containing pro forma
consideration of required criteria and outsourced responses to
comments or decisional documents. In other words, the record of
the agency’s decision may include less information about the
agency’s real decision-making process, and more documentation of
the directed deliberation in order to forestall judicial or other
external scrutiny. 180 Thus, the deliberative record is not especially
likely to contain candid recommendations and opinions of

178. Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023,
2035 (2008).
179. See generally Seidenfeld, supra note 25.
180. The rise of pre-decisional requirements has been followed by the development of an
industry for the outsourcing of directed deliberation. See, e.g., ICF CONSULTING, THE REG
MAP, available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/reginfo/Regmap/index.jsp (promoting
the company as “[e]xpert[] in drafting rulemaking documents and preparing supporting
analyses”). Full disclosure: although I was employed by ICF Incorporated between 1990 and
1992, I did not develop or use the Reg Map. It is handy, though.
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subordinates so much as draft documents prepared as a bulwark
against litigation or administrative challenge to the agency’s decision.
Further, the proliferation of directed deliberation undercuts the
notion that, in order to deliberate properly, an agency requires
secrecy. By adding required topics of deliberation, the legislature and
executive have prioritized certain subjects for deliberation, and
reduced the likelihood that communications on those high-priority
topics can be kept secret. Thus, although confidential deliberation is
appealing, the growth of directed deliberation indicates a
diminishing level of trust in the agency’s non-supervised (i.e.,
secret) deliberations.
In addition, the expansion of collaborative or cooperative
deliberation among agencies suggests that interagency deliberation
resembles the interactions in open meetings, and therefore should be
accessible, even if it is in the form of records. When agencies convey
their considered opinions to another agency in a process that is
intended (by either agency) to affect the decision, it is an exercise of
power between two agencies, not a candid consideration of options
by subordinates. Thus, the purpose of the deliberative process
exemption to public records statutes is not served.
V. BEYOND THE DELIBERATION PARADOX
Uncertain in theory and frustrating in practice, the Deliberation
Paradox is unsupportable, particularly due to the way it twists
deference doctrines in administrative law. Does the paradox make
sense as either policy or through theory? Not anymore. The harder
question is whether there is any other way.
A. Step Zero: The Deliberation Paradox Should Be Recognized
and Discarded
There is another way, but first the Deliberation Paradox must be
seen for what it is and discarded: an anachronism no longer
supported by either theory or practice. But for that to happen, it
needs to be recognized in the first place.
For the most part, the dual valence of deliberation in
administrative law (and particularly open government law) has been
either ignored or papered over with a general observation about the
common purpose of open government laws (an observation
demonstrated to be untrue in Part I.C, supra). To the extent that the
paradox has been noticed, it has only been observed as a flaw in open
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meeting laws, and the subject of reform proposals narrowly aimed at
porting a deliberative process exemption from open record law to
open meeting law. 181 As discussed above in sections I.C and II.C,
these critiques evince a failure to recognize the depth of
the paradox.
Were courts and commentators to squarely face the conflict in
deliberation, it may force both those seeking access and the
government (generally opposing access) to better explain the true
value of deliberation, whether secret, in records, or public, in
meetings. Because deliberation is not defined by statute, but left to
the litigants and the courts, the recognition of the paradox may
provide the parties an array of demonstrative arguments and
examples demonstrating what, precisely, deliberation is and why it
has significance.
For example, an agency seeking to withhold documents under
the deliberative process privilege should be held to account for the
exact role those documents had in the agency’s deliberations. Were
the documents considered? By whom? Did they contain
recommendations of individuals within the government, or from
outside advisors (whose participation in the process may even
implicate open meeting laws)? What role did they have in the
decision-making process? Would disclosure of the documents harm
future decisions? In light of deference doctrines, is there something
about the document that strengthens the agency’s claim
to legitimacy? 182
As another example, a citizen wanting access to “two by two”
pre-meeting briefings of school board members 183 should be able to
explain why sub-quorum briefings, when held in series, is the
functional equivalent of deliberation. The citizen may contend that

181. See discussion accompanying supra note 135.
182. See, e.g., Margaret Kwoka, Deferring to Secrecy, 54 B.C. L. REV. 185, 219–20 (2013)
(noting that courts tend to defer to an agency’s interpretation of the level of confidentiality
necessary to protect its deliberative process).
183. As mentioned supra, “two by two” meetings are a series of meetings of a subquorum number of officials of a body covered by an open meeting statute. “Two by two”
meetings are a common method by which government bodies avoid risking an open meeting
law violation. See, e.g., Denise Civiletti, So Much for Open Meetings, RIVERHEAD LOCAL (Nov.
19, 2012), http://www.riverheadlocal.com/civiletti/so-much-for-open-meetings; Donal
Brown, Crescent City: Town government bodies may be stretching open meeting laws, FIRST
AMENDMENT COALITION (Feb. 3, 2010), https://firstamendmentcoalition.org/2010/02/
crescent-city-town-government-meetings-may-stretch-open-meeting-laws/.
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the same briefing contents might be found “deliberative” (and thus
inaccessible) if contained in mere records.
Thus, even the recognition that deliberation’s face appears on
both sides of the open government coin may have a salutary effect
on litigants’ and courts’ treatment of these issues.
B. Step One: Reconciliation Begins with Records
For the most part, the sort of deliberation envisioned by
deference doctrine takes place in records, or in meetings that would
not be governed by the Sunshine Act, FACA, or state open meetings
laws. A committee of non-presidential appointed staff, or one-onone city council meetings, or an exchange of memos or emails over
the course of days—the everyday stuff of an agency’s deliberations—
is unlikely to be daylighted by open meetings laws. Thus, if such
deliberation is to be disclosed, it might only be done through public
records laws.
Consequently, the material most necessary to demonstrate the
extent of an agency’s deliberative process (and therefore most helpful in
earning it judicial deference) is the least likely to be open to public view.
Although the agency can waive any deliberative process exemptions and
disclose voluntarily, that has not been agency practice. 184
Much has been made of the counter-majoritarian nature of
deliberative democracy, 185 and the same observation applies to
administrative deliberation. The argument goes like this: Any
decision that is affected by anything other than majority will is, in
some way, contrary to it. Thus, to the extent that an agency
considers minority views or applies a decision factor or structure that
incorporates a principle that hinders or dilutes the majority position,
it harms it.
In this way, the concealment of deliberation also seeks to permit
counter-majoritarian policy development, and protect it from
disclosure or public scrutiny. The requirement for deliberation,
judicial deference to it, and open government law’s exemption for
deliberative records are three layers of insulation of agency action
from majoritarian or democratic influence. They share an overall

184. See generally Kwoka, supra note 182.
185. See, e.g., James A. Gardner, The Incompatible Treatment of Majorities in Election Law
and Deliberative Democracy, 12 ELECTION L. J. 468, 474 (2013).
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suspicion of public scrutiny, transparency, and political accountability
of agencies.
This suspicion is reflected elsewhere in administrative law,
particularly in the disfavored place that political policy preferences
occupy in judicial review of agency action. If we do not expect agency
decisions to reflect public policy preferences—or, rather, those of
elected officials—then we accept a disconnect between them.
C. Step Two: Tie Deference to Disclosure of Deliberation
Deliberation is a powerful concept in administrative law because
it describes an agency’s best effort to make a decision on the pure
merits of a question. By implication (or necessity) this concept
excludes or rejects arbitrary decision making, biased decision
making, and any process that aims to accomplish something other
than an objective solution to the problem at hand (e.g., political
favor allocation, punishment, or market distortion). Thus, it makes
sense that a court would defer to an agency’s decision if it followed a
sufficiently deliberative process. This is especially the case because
reviewing courts are encouraged to focus on an agency’s process,
rather than a policy’s substance. A court wanting to question the
substance of a policy could, instead, fault the agency’s process
leading up to the adoption of the policy.
Such is the outcome of the long battle over the meaning of
“hard look” review, which can be resolved as an inquiry into an
agency’s process, rather than an investigation of the merits of the
agency’s policy. 186 Even Chevron step two, which on the surface
requires examination of the outcome of a policy determination, is
often presented as an inquiry into process (whether the policy was
the result of a reasoned decision-making process). 187 When process is
king, deliberative processes are the coin of the realm.
The deference doctrines, however, were developing at the same
time that FOIA’s deliberative process exemption was being
interpreted. The courts, however, are rarely asked to reconcile these
two ways of looking at agency decision making (the two ways
being deference and secrecy in records).

186. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
51–54 (1983) (applying a careful examination of the agency’s failure to use a process that fully
considered various options).
187. See Seidenfeld, supra note 25.
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In order to reconcile the value of deliberation with the virtues of
disclosure, I propose that courts grant an agency deference only for
deliberative processes that are publicly disclosed. In other words, if
an agency wishes to occupy the judicial ground to say what the law
is, it must earn it not only by deliberating, but by deliberating in
public view.
My proposal would not require a reconsideration of FOIA or
state public records laws, or a reassessment of Chevron, Skidmore, or
Auer. It could be accomplished through judicial or agency
interpretation of existing case and statutory law. When applying
Chevron step two, in which a reviewing court examines the agency’s
reasoned decision-making process, the court should only defer to
deliberation that has been disclosed. To be sure, agencies already
disclose substantial material in certain decision-making contexts. An
agency must publish a Concise Explanatory Statement upon
rulemaking; must, in some circumstances, provide a statement of
reasons for disregarding comments; must publish an Environmental
Impact Statement or the like. Disclosure of deliberation, however, is
distinct from these reason-giving exercises. First, disclosure of
deliberation documents what happened, as distinct from providing a
justification for the end product. Following that, deliberative
documentation cannot be outsourced (or can only be outsourced to
the extent that the overall decision, itself, was outsourced). None of
these existing disclosure requirements include a mandate that the
agency produce records that reflect its deliberative process.
The timing of the disclosure, however, is critical. Rather than
disclosing deliberation in the throes of APA litigation, a court should
defer only if the deliberation were disclosed, substantially, in the
Concise Explanatory Statement that accompanies a rulemaking, 188
and treated subsequently requested documents as if they were
referenced by decision, and disclosed pre-litigation.
Although this solution would not require a radical
reinterpretation of Chevron, the APA, or FOIA, it would have major
implications for their future development.
First, this solution would reinvigorate the “reasoned process”
interpretation of Chevron step two, further incentivizing
deliberation. In so doing, it may have implications for certain
readings of deference doctrine, such as the agency expertise or
188.
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“institution matching” 189 models, because it offers deference based
on process, rather than history, or
credentials,
or
even
congressional grant of general subject matter authority.
Second, this solution is much better suited to the increasingly
complex world of inter-agency problem-solving and crossgovernment consultation. Where an “institution matching” model
looks to expertise, and a congressional grant model looks to subject
matter authority, open deliberation would favor transparency and
consideration of various viewpoints, and a reason-giving requirement
for agency action.
Third, and most importantly, this solution would give agencies a
strong incentive to make internal and inter-agency deliberative
records public. No disclosure, no deference.
D. Step Three: Disclose Interagency Consultation
The development of collaborative and cooperative deliberation
suggests that inter-agency communications should not come within
the deliberative process exemptions of open record laws. When an
agency’s expertise is sought, when it uses its internal deliberative
process, and then transmits its opinion, recommendation, or analysis
to a peer agency, the communication bears a strong resemblance to
communications among members of a body covered by open
meetings laws. Consequently, where possible, courts and agencies
should daylight interagency consultative records. 190
Relatedly, this proposal might further exclude from the
deliberative process exemption any documents submitted to the
government by an outside party, unless the outside party was acting
as the government’s agent. As noted above, some states have so
expansively interpreted the deliberative process privilege that it now
encompasses documents sent to the government from an outside
party during an arms-length adversarial process. 191
Furthermore, courts should interpret the deliberative process
exemption to open record laws so as not to apply to deliberative
documents after the related decision has been made by the

189. See, e.g., Huq, supra note 175.
190. This recommendation would require changes to FOIA, which creates the threshold
question whether a record is an inter- or intra-agency memorandum.
191. See ACLU v. City of Seattle, discussed in text accompanying note 68.
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government. 192 Thus, the temporal gap between meetings (which
must be open in real time) and records (which, under FOIA and
some state laws can be secret in perpetuity) may be narrowed. State
courts that end the exemption after a decision reason that the
exemption is justified by the need for secrecy during the decisionmaking process, but discount the possible chilling effect of ending
the exemption after the decision-making process is complete. 193
Although FOIA and some states have not adopted this revision,
states that do disclose deliberative documents after a decision do not
appear to have suffered a breakdown in deliberation. 194
VI. CONCLUSION
The Deliberation Paradox describes a conundrum in
administrative law, a problem that centers on our desire for
democratically unaccountable decision makers to act with care and
consideration, but our need to inquire to ensure that this is done.
Administrative law wishes to both trust that agencies deliberate and
to verify that they do.
In turn, the central role in deference doctrines for agency
deliberation reflects a gap between administrative law and the
Deliberation Paradox. This Article’s proposal—to squarely recognize
the paradox, defer only to disclosed deliberation, and daylight
interagency consultation—aims to resolve this disconnect.
Although this prescription would not work a revolution in open
government or administrative law, it would have a significant impact
on internal agency decisions about disclosure. This solution joins a
number of other agency critiques that propose to link, or condition,
judicial acceptance of agency behavior with transparency. 195 In so
doing, this proposal seeks to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of
administrative decision making through disclosure and public scrutiny.

192. This change is already present in many state public records laws, but not in FOIA.
193. This does not resolve all questions, of course; many courts struggle with when,
exactly, a decision-making process is complete, particularly in the criminal investigative and nodecision contexts. See, e.g., Newman v. King Cnty., 947 P.2d 712 (Wash. 1997).
194. See, e.g., ACLU v. Seattle, 89 P.3d 295, 297–300 (Wash. 2004) (records later
disclosed were not claimed to have harmed future deliberations).
195. Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108
MICH. L. REV. 1127 (2010); Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and
Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2 (2009).
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This Article shows that such a proposal is entirely within the
purpose and history of open government and administrative law.
Banishing the Deliberation Paradox would not contribute to
Madison’s Farce or Tragedy, but rather would bring a consistent
approach to the complex drama of deliberation and transparency.
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